






THE U.S. CONGRESS EITHER OVERREACTS OR UNDERPERFORMS: 
 
THE U.S. POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL MANDATE, NEGLECTED HIGHWAY 

















A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for 












© 2016 Harrison M. Wadsworth, IV 




Why, when, and how does Congress pass legislation? John Kingdon theorized in 
Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies that the U.S. Congress is unlikely to act on major 
public policy issues unless there is an event to focus the public’s attention. Compelled to 
act in the window of opportunity after a focusing event, Congress is likely to enact 
hastily considered policy, particularly if a proposed policy solution is already on the 
minds of legislators. Thus, the Congress typically either overreacts in passing legislation, 
or underperforms by doing nothing at all.  
The Kingdon theory is tested against the 2008 enactment of the Positive Train 
Control railroad technology mandate and found to hold strong predictive value. The 
theory is then tested against examples of the Congress’s unwillingness to raise excise 
taxes on gasoline to fund transportation programs or increase federal truck weight 
limits. Again, the theory is found to be valid, especially when informed by other studies 
of Congressional action.  
Lastly, recent scholarship on the Congress, and interviews with individuals with 
professional and academic experience with Congress, inform a discussion of what could 
be done to strengthen Congress so that it achieves better public policy outcomes.  The 
lasting utility of Kingdon’s theory suggests its conclusions and lessons should inform 
any effort to improve Congress.  
Everyone would be well served by a Congress with the capacity to enact 
carefully considered policy in a timely manner. The thesis identifies and examines 
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several elegant solutions available to enhance the Congress’s ability to make informed, 
rational policy decisions. The thesis finds that the degree to which members of the U.S. 
House and Senate feel politically vulnerable, a modern media climate that monetizes 
outrage, low institutional capacity for policy development, and counterproductive 
lobbying regulations contribute to the Congress’s tendency towards either stasis or 
impulsive activity.  
 Dr. Benjamin Ginsberg, Ph.D., Dr. Douglas Harris, Ph.D., Dr. Dorothea Wolfson, 
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How, when, and why does Congress takes action on major policy issues? Is it 
because the people they represent want a new law? Are laws made after careful, timely 
consideration of the various policy options? John Kingdon theorized in Agendas, 
Alternatives, and Public Policies that the U.S. Congress is unlikely to act on major public 
policy issues unless there is an event to focus the public’s attention. Acting under duress 
while public attention is focused on the Congressional response to the issue of the day, 
short-term political objectives supersede long-term policy concerns. Compelled to act in 
the window of opportunity after a focusing event, good governance is relegated to 
second-tier status, while any obvious policy that will resolve political tension wins the 
day. The problem is the obvious solution is not necessarily the best. The Congress is 
most likely to enact imprudent policy if that proposed solution is already on the minds 
of legislators as a potential quick-fix. Thus, the Congress is most likely to address 
pressing public policy issues in a haphazard manner, under a tight timeline. Likewise, it 
is unlikely to move on important policies unless there is an event to focus public 
attention. As a result, Congress typically either overreacts in passing legislation, or 
underperforms by doing nothing at all.  
The answers to the basic questions of how, when and why Congress takes action 
are essential for understanding the development and enactment of American public 
policy. They also have implications for how the American government is able to 
effectively function as a representative institution that is responsive to the needs of its 
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people.  The following portfolio is an examination of how several leading theories and 
models of Congressional activity can inform answers to these essential questions.  
In particular, this portfolio tests a theory put forth by John Kingdon in the mid-
1980s founded upon his hands-on experience researching Congress. When will the 
Congress act? Kingdon found the Congress is most likely to enact significant if pushed 
to do so. In his words, “that push is sometimes provided by a focusing event like a crisis 
or disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem.”1  
How will they act? Kingdon found the Congress is most likely to act swiftly on 
major issues in the wake of a focusing event and under duress from the related political 
pressure they experience. The potential solutions on the agenda are those which 
government officials, and people outside of government who maintain contact with 
those officials, consider legitimate. 2 Presidents, Cabinet Secretaries, Committee 
Chairmen and individual members of Congress can only conceive of a limited set of 
policies at a given time. Thus, since Congress is most likely to act in the wake of a 
focusing event, from an interest group’s perspective, being on the agenda ahead of time 
is a key for success.  
Why do they act? Kingdon, Mayhew, King, Arnold  and others observe that the 
degree to which American politicians feel politically vulnerable explains their 
motivation for taking official actions, up to and including passing legislation.3 In short, 
                                                          
1 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. (1995): 94-95. 
2 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. (1995): 3. 
3 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. (1995): 94-95; 
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the Kingdon theory answers a fundamental question: what makes it onto the 
Congressional agenda and what does it take for items to be cleared from that agenda?  
This portfolio evaluates the validity of this thirty-year-old theory in light of 
several recent transportation policy cases. It finds the theory continues to hold strong 
predictive power for the behavior of the contemporary U.S. Congress in the context of 
the policy examples evaluated.  
The portfolio also responds to the primary criticism of Kingdon’s theory; 
specifically, that it tries to explain too much about the major activities of a large 
institution. That is, it suffers from its own excess: by attempting to explain everything, it 
ends up explaining almost nothing, and is therefore of little use for people who are 
trying to understand the timing and motivation of Congressional activity.4  
The portfolio concludes that despite the general nature of the theory, it continues 
to hold strong predictive power that provides an important high-level of understanding 
for intuitions, industries and individuals impacted by the decisions made by the U.S. 
Congress. In other words, anyone whose makes it their business to understand the 
Congress would be well advised to understand the Kingdon theory and keep it in mind 
when preparing to engage the Congress as an advocate, work there as a politician or 
staffer, or simply thrive as a business that must follow U.S. law.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Mayhew, David R. “Observations on "congress: The Electoral Connection" a Quarter Century After Writing 
It”. PS: Political Science and Politics 34. (2001): 256; King, Anthony. “The Vulnerable American 
Politician”. British Journal of Political Science 27. Cambridge University Press. (1997): 1; Arnold, R D. The logic 
of congressional action. New Haven: Yale University Press (1990): 10. 




Method and Procedure for Evaluating the Kingdon Theory  
The first chapter explains the theory in great detail, tests it against several recent 
transportation policy examples and finds that the theory is valid and has strong 
predictive power. An examination of the relevant literature and history finds Kingdon’s 
theory would have predicted that in 2008, after a major accident focused Congress’ 
attention on railroad safety, they mandated that railroads install Positive Train Control 
(PTC) technology by a date certain. It would also have accurately predicted that the 
ultimate policy outcome was hastily considered, with greater emphasis placed on short-
term political expediency than orderly policy choices. As a result, in the years following 
the mandate, the Congress and Executive Branch were forced to deal with interagency 
coordination problems, a protracted rulemaking process, and predictable technology 
delivery delays that ultimately forced the Congress to revise and extend the PTC 
implementation deadline.  
The flip side of the Kingdon theory is the prediction that the Congress avoids 
taking action on major policy items unless the public pressure raises the saliency of an 
issue. The second chapter of this portfolio concludes that the Kingdon theory, again, is 
useful in its ability to predict when Congress will not take action. Specifically, it 
evaluates two decades of Congress’s refusal to find a sustainable funding source for the 
Highway Trust Fund that funds federal surface transportation programs, and a series of 
actions in 2011 that resulted in the Congress refusing to increase truck weight limits on 
federal highways. Again, it finds the Kingdon theory—particularly when considerations 
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of political vulnerability in the contemporary political context are considered—would 
predict these outcomes. As the Kingdon model would envision, the chapter finds 
inaction results from a lack of an event related to these highway policies that is 
significant enough to compel members of Congress to set aside their politically 
defensive posture in order to take action. Additionally, the chapter determines that the 
agenda-setting role of well organized outside interest groups in these policy examples 
aligns with the Kingdon theory. 
 The third chapter examines the policy implications of the conclusion that the 
Congress is most likely to act either under duress (i.e. the PTC mandate), or not at all 
(i.e. the gas tax and truck weight limits). In the crudest sense, the theory holds that, 
acting in the shadow of a crisis, the Congress is likely to approve policies on the basis of 
political optics and a desire to appear responsive, rather than on the merits of the 
particular policy.5 Next, it considers leading suggestions for strengthening the Congress 
as an institution, so that it might become more capable of enacting wise, well considered 
policies when the next crisis strikes. The chapter examines the policy implications of the 
gerrymandering of Congressional districts. It then sheds light on the Congress’s lack of 
institutional capacity for policy development in terms of personnel and financial 
resources. It then describes the modern media climate, which rewards politicians for 
playing to the extremes in policy debates and is largely indifferent when Congressmen 
take political risks to enact wise policy. From there, it delves into how the contemporary 
regime for regulating activities expressly protected by the First Amendment (lobbying 
                                                          
5 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. (1995): 58. 
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Congress) has only served to strengthen the influence of the most powerful interests, 
further marginalized smaller interests, and groundlessly eroded public trust in the 
Legislative Branch. It then moves to an examination of the decline in personal 
interaction among members of Congress. Lastly, there is a discussion of who is best 
positioned to lead any efforts to address these problems. 
 The ultimate conclusion of these tests and an examination of the related 
implications is that Kingdon’s theory, despite its broad reach, is worthy of consideration 
by anyone interested contributing to an effort to make the U.S. Congress a stronger and 
more responsive representative institution.   
Interviews with Practitioners Provide Unique Insights 
 The activities of the U.S. government and the related political intrigue are the 
subject of more conversation and speculation than perhaps any other single subject in 
America. Just about everyone in America has some sort of theory or opinion about what 
is “really” going on in Washington. Everyone from your cab driver, to your grandfather, 
to your boss, to your undergraduate political science professor has an opinion. But the 
fact is some opinions are more valuable than others.  
 This portfolio contains hundreds of references to the work of professional, 
academic scholars of Congress. Their rigorous research into the observable trends, 
historical context and theoretical understandings of this complex institution are 
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invaluable. However, most of these researchers draw conclusions6 about what is “really” 
going on in the “back rooms,” despite having little or no actual experience working in or 
alongside the Congress in those rooms. Therefore, the author sought input from the day-
to-day practitioners of Congressional politics to fill in some of the information gaps that 
exist.  
Throughout the following discussion, excerpts from interviews with current and 
former politicians, Congressional staff, and lobbyists (some of whom fall into more than 
one of those categories) provide supportive “color commentary” and anecdotal evidence 
based on personal experience, for the phenomena identified by the academics.  The 
author interviewed more than twenty of these professionals for this research. The 
interview subjects come from an array of political and professional backgrounds, from 
former leading Republican politicians, to current Democratic staffers, to career non-
partisan professional lobbyists. Their perspectives are informed by real world 
experience and provide an fuller understanding of how congress actually behaves. 
Several especially insightful responses to the question of what contributes to the 
seemingly manic nature of the modern Congress are included at the start of major 
sections. Due to the public nature of this profession and sensitive subject matter, some 
asked to not be referenced by name. While their statements should be taken as 
anecdotal, their insights are nonetheless important and valuable to a complete 
understanding of how the Congress makes decisions.  
                                                          
6 Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. Lobbying 
and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (2009): 15. 
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Implications and Conclusions  
The implications of Kingdon’s theory have been widely examined. As political 
scientists, commentators, and just about anyone paying half-attention to the American 
political process knows: the problems associated with the Congressional agenda-setting 
are neither new nor unusual in American politics. Indeed, the tendency to vacillate 
between stasis and clearing agenda items identified by elite factions when the public 
demands action are built in to the Constitutional system. 7  However, this portfolio 
concludes that these drawbacks of an otherwise wonderfully elegant and competent 
political system are exacerbated by the various constraints on today’s Congress’s ability 
to operate. While almost every conceivable factor that could limit the institution’s ability 
to craft and enact wise policy has increased, America, its culture and economy continue 
to grow ever more complex, desperately in need of thoughtful leadership.  
Personal Disclosure  
The author’s interest in this subject goes beyond academic intrigue. The author is 
a former staffer in the House of Representatives who served for a member of the 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee when the PTC mandate was enacted. That 
service was followed by six years as an advocate and lobbyist for the railroad industry 
as it survived an economic crisis in the highly competitive transportation industry, while 
struggling to comply with and ultimately delay the implementation date of the 
unprecedented technology mandate. He now works for a manufacturing and technology 
                                                          
7 Hamilton, Alexander; Madison, James; and Jay, John. The Federalist. Edited by Jacob E. Cooke. 
Middletown, Conn. Wesleyan University Press. (1961). 
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company that is a supplier to the rail industry. It is the author’s hope that the following 
is an impartial examination of the relevant historical and theoretical facts and their 
implications. Rather than potentially prejudicing the research, the author believes his 
professional experience, combined with disciplined academic research, provides a 




The Positive Train Control Mandate: 
John Kingdon’s Theory of Congressional Action Predicted the 
Congressional Response to Railroad Accidents 
 
Distraction, Death and Destruction in California 
On September 12, 2008, a Metrolink commuter train full of passengers was on its 
way to a station in Chatsworth, California. Tragically, the train’s engineer was texting on 
his cell phone while operating the train and did not notice a red light signal directing 
him to stop the train to allow a Union Pacific freight train to pass along a single track. As 
the Metrolink engineer looked at his phone’s screen, his train collided head-on with the 
stationary Union Pacific locomotive, killing him and 24 of the train’s passengers, and 
injuring 135 others.8 Within days, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
reported that if a technology system known as Positive Train Control (PTC) had been in 
place, the accident would not have occurred.9 Three years earlier, the NTSB determined 
PTC could have prevented a train crash near a textile mill in Graniteville, South 
Carolina.10 In that accident, ten people were killed and 250 were injured when a train 
passed through a misaligned switch, derailed and ruptured several cars which released 
                                                          
8 Rubin, Joel, et al. “Total destruction: At least 17 die in head-on metrolink crash.” Los Angeles Times. 
September 13, 2008. 
9 National Transportation Safety Board Railroad Accident Report on Collission of Metrolink Train 111 With 
Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 in Chatsworth, CA on September 12, 2008. NTSB/RAR-10/01. January 21, 2010. 
10 National Transportation Safety Board Railroad Accident Report on Collision of Norfolk Southern Local 
Train P22 with Sbsequent Hazardous Materials Release at Graniteville, SC on January 6, 2005. NTSB/RAR-
05/04. June 15, 2006.  
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toxic chlorine gas. If the accident had occurred while the textile mill was in operation, 
hundreds more may have died.  
In light of these horrific accidents, a thorough investigation and measured 
response by federal authorities with jurisdiction over railroad safety was in order. 
Unfortunately, this did not happen. Instead, the Congress reactively enacted a mandate 
to require the installation of PTC on any rail lines used to transport passengers or toxic-
by-inhalation materials by December 31, 2015.  
This chapter explores the facts surrounding the above mentioned railroad 
accidents and examines the extent to which the subsequent Congressional response 
aligns with John Kingdon’s theory of Congressional action. After describing the facts of 
the railroad accident, it explains Kingdon’s theory and the value of evaluating it against 
this recent policy example. Next, through careful examination of the relevant factors and 
other theories of Congressional activity, it determines the Congressional response of 
mandating a specific safety technology fits the Kingdon model. Then, there is a 
discussion of how the Congress at the micro and macro levels realizes political benefits 
from reacting to perceived crises. The chapter determines that in this case, even though 
the Congress’s policy solution was so flawed that it had to be revised, the members who 
supported the flawed policy were able to achieve a second round of political victories in 
the process of fixing the policy. This bolsters an understanding of why the Congress 
behaves in the way Kingdon describes. The ultimate conclusion of the chapter is that the 
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Congressional response to a focusing event in this railroad policy example fits 
Kingdon’s theory of Congressional action.  
In short, this chapter answers fundamental questions about the First Branch of 
Government: What factors influence the timing, rationale and specifics of lawmaking in 
the U.S. Congress? Do they act because the people they represent want a new law? Or 
perhaps laws are made after careful, timely consideration of the various policy options. 
These questions surrounding Congressional action are a key issue facing many 
American industries, including the railroads.  
Railroads and Congress 
As one of the first modern American industries, the freight railroads have more 
than one hundred years of experience with significant federal government safety 
regulation. As such, the importance of Washington representation is well understood by 
railroad management. In fact, historically railroads provided Congress with 
opportunities, “…to form a foundation for regulating interstate commerce, and it 
provided the Supreme Court with cases that would establish judicial precedence used in 
decisions for decades to come. The effects of railroads in the United States are found in 
the historical roots, and the structural branches, of the federal government.”11 So it is no 
surprise that the railroads were one of the first American industries to organize an 
effective, coordinated lobbying operation.  
                                                          
11 Black, David. “Testing the Streams Theory of the Public Policy Process Using Three Case Studies in the 
Field of U.S. Freight Rail Policy.” Thesis for The Johns Hopkins University Master’s Program. (2011): 2. 
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Initially, the railroads began to coordinate their activities out of necessity. 
Historian Douglass Michael notes that, “In the 1870’s, advocates of standardization 
began to make themselves heard in railroading circles. The Civil War had brought about 
the first large scale interline movement of goods, and consequently, had demonstrated 
the consequences of non-uniformity…As interline freight movements grew, it became 
evident that some more universal method of interchanging freight cars was necessary.”12 
In 1872, the general managers of the nation’s largest railroads met in Louisville, 
Kentucky at what is now known as the Time Table Conventions, to develop 
standardized time zones in the U.S. and Canada, in an effort to end the confusion of 
dealing with thousands of local times.13 This group of managers soon formed the 
American Railway Association (ARA), and in October 1934 the ARA and several other 
railroad trade groups merged to form the Association of American Railroads (AAR).14  
Today, as in the 1930s, Washington representation of the rail industry is one of 
the missions of the AAR. The AAR is known as a powerful force in Washington, DC.15 
Since railroads operate in almost every state and congressional district, where they 
provide high-quality employment and offer a critical service for leading businesses, the 
rail industry has a significant platform from which to advocate for its interests. 
Furthermore, since federal law and regulations impact most railroads similarly, the AAR 
                                                          
12 Douglass, Michael. “A History of the Association of American Railroads.” University of Pennsylvania. 
(1962): 2. 
13 Roemmele, Brian. “How, When, and Why Were Time Zones Created?” Huffington Post. September 17, 
2014. 
14 Douglass, Michael. “A History of the Association of American Railroads.” University of Pennsylvania. 
(1962): 74. 




does not suffer from infighting and a lack of direction from its Board of Directors—an 
affliction that paralyzes some trade associations, rendering them ineffective.16 In fact, 
during a hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee in 2010, Chairman Jay Rockefeller 
(D-WV) stated, “The AAR is the most powerful trade association in Washington; they 
put the NRA to shame.”17 In 2015, as the Congress prepared to extend the Positive Train 
Control implementation deadline, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) stated:  
By the way, I like to work with the railroads because they do a lot of good things. 
They are very powerful, they are very strong, and they have a very powerful lobby. 
It is not a Republican lobby or a Democratic lobby. It is a lobby that covers 
everybody.18 
 
Given the purported power of the railroad lobby, one might imagine, in the 
crudest sense, the AAR to be an army of lobbyists controlling the official activities of 
members of Congress. One might find it difficult to envision a situation in which the 
industry is slapped with a mandate to install a theoretical, non-existent, unproven 
technology system that could potentially offer safety benefits in only a tiny fraction of 
rail accidents, with a price tag exceeding $10 billion. All of those assumptions are wrong: 
the railroads were forced to install an advanced, satellite-based PTC –technology that 
was only theoretical at the time. Let’s see if a political theory might help us understand 
how this happened—and if the railroad executives might have anticipated some sort of 
knee-jerk Congressional reaction the moment they heard about the Chatsworth accident.  
                                                          
16 Drutman, Lee. The business of America is lobbying : how corporations became politicized and politics became more 
corporate. Oxford New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2015): 139.  
17 Rockefeller, John. U.S. Congress. Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee Hearing, The 
Federal Role in National Rail Policy. 111th Congress, 2nd sess. September 15, 2010.  
18 Boxer, Barbara, speaking on “Positive Train Control”. 114th Congress, 1st sess. Congressional Record-Senate. 
(October 28, 2015): S7577.  
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Why Evaluate Kingdon’s Theory? 
A theory’s usefulness can be judged by its utility in helping us better understand 
the phenomena we observe and its power to predict future events. In his landmark 1984 
treatise on how public policy is made in Washington, John Kingdon laid out a theory of 
how, why and when Congress acts. Rather than getting bogged down in the details of 
Congressional organization and personalities, he asks and answers a more fundamental 
question: how does an idea’s time come?19 In other words, what makes it onto the 
Congressional agenda and what does it take for items to be cleared from that agenda? 
His simple conclusion is that Congress needs to be pushed before it will take action. As 
Kingdon puts it, “that push is sometimes provided by a focusing event like a crisis or 
disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem.”20 
One of the most elegant aspects of Kingdon’s theory is that it is immune to 
“reform,” or other changes to the Congress. It holds regardless of how many committees 
and offices there are,21 or whether lobbyists have to register and report their activities. 
The theory is not static: we can expect it to hold true regardless of which party controls 
the gavels or the strength of the personalities in leadership. Although the theory has 
been criticized for being too imprecise and dismissive of the rational-actor and 
incrementalist models,22 the shunning of these revered and formal models of 
                                                          
19 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. (1995): 1. 
20 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. (1995): 94-95. 
21 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The OTA Legacy: 1972-1995 (Washington, DC: April 
1996); A reference to Public Law 110-81, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act. 




understanding politics may be what makes this “general” theory so useful. Politics is a 
complicated business with countless unknown variables; devising a formula to predict 
future political events is likely impossible. So with that in mind, Kingdon did the next 
best thing: he described focusing events, something of a compass to look to for direction 
or guidance. A compass will not direct a person home, but it will give a bearing. And 
even though the compass does not point to true north, one can get close enough to have 
an idea of what might come next on the trail. Unconvinced? Keep reading. This chapter 
will run the theory through the story of the PTC mandate as a test case.  
Another reason Kingdon’s work is worthy of thoughtful and continued 
consideration is that he did not develop his theory from a perch in the ivory tower of a 
university library. Nor did he do it an ocean away, enmeshed in a completely separate 
political society.23 His study is based on 247 lengthy and detailed interviews with 
congressional staff, executive branch political appointees, and upper-level civil servants 
and presidential staff in 1976, 1977, 1978, and 1979.24 This author is not interested in 
theories that simply sound good in a university lecture hall. The only theory that is 
worth consideration is one that is based on real-world experience and designed to 
interpret and predict real-world events.  
Even if Kingdon’s theory is too general for some to deem worthy of 
consideration, at least it compliments other well regarded theories of congressional 
operations. For instance, it aligns well with David Mayhew’s classic work in 
                                                          
23 Anthony King penned his criticism of Kingdon’s theory from the University of Essex in England.  
24 Wirth, Clifford J. Review of Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy. The American Political Science Review 79 
Cambridge University Press. (1985): 213. 
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demonstrating that Congress can be analyzed by simply assuming that all Congressional 
activity can be understood through a simple lesson: that the electoral imperative shapes 
the design and activities of the institution.25 In other words, Kingdon’s theory that 
individual members of Congress can only be motivated to act in unison in the face of 
focusing events compliments Mayhew’s notion that these individual members are acting 
based on their own electoral concerns. Mayhew cited an illustrative quotation from the 
late Senator William B. Sacbe (R-OH) that, “Most [members of Congress] are willing 
only to follow those things that will protect them and give them the coloration which 
allows them to blend into their respective districts or their respective states. If you don’t 
stick your neck out, you don’t get it chopped off.”26 Ignoring a highly public, focusing 
event would be the equivalent of a sticking one’s proverbial neck out.  
Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz uncovered a phenomenon similar to 
Kingdon’s theory of how legislation is enacted, regarding the way the Congress 
conducts its oversight function. Their 1984 study pushes back against the contemporary 
assumption that Congress largely neglects its oversight function. Instead, they 
demonstrate that what many political scientists interpreted as a dereliction of oversight 
duties is actually, “…a preference—an eminently rational one—for fire-alarm 
oversight.”27 Fire-alarm oversight refers to waiting for someone other than Congress (i.e. 
individual citizens and organized interest groups) to “pull the alarm” on violations of 
                                                          
25 Mayhew, David. “Observations on ‘Congress: The Electoral Connection’ a Quarter Century after Writing 
It.” PS: Political Science and Politics 34.2 (2001): 251-2. 
26 Mayhew, David R. Congress : the electoral connection. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press. (2004): 11. 
27 McCubbins, Mathew D., and Schwartz Thomas. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols 
versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (1984): 176. 
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legislative goals, as opposed to police-patrol oversight in which Congress would 
regularly examine how agencies are carrying out Congressional intent.28  Whereas 
Kingdon found members of Congress are prone to utilizing their legislative power in 
response to a crisis, McCubbins and Schwartz point out that members of Congress also 
utilize their oversight power in response to a crisis.  
Before continuing, it is important to recognize the limitations of attempting to fit 
a complicated series of human events into a tidy political theory. That is not this author’s 
intention. As Mayhew observed in critiquing his own study of Congressional activity, 
“political reality is very complicated…” and no single view of this activity can explain 
everything.29 And certainly other theories and methods of interpreting Congressional 
activity offer valuable insight into this particular series of events. Certainly Anthony 
King’s theory that the high degree of electoral vulnerability faced by American 
politicians—contested primary elections in the case of the politicians in this case—result 
in, “the high incidence in America of purely symbolic politics, the drastic foreshortening 
of American politicians’ time horizons and the difficulty that the American system often 
has in taking tough decisions”30 contributes to, rather than detracts from, Kingdon’s 
theory. This is particularly true in the PTC example, as outlined below. These and many 
other interpretations of Congressional activity are likely useful in understanding how 
                                                          
28 McCubbins, Mathew D., and Schwartz Thomas. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols 
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30 King, Anthony. “The Vulnerable American Politician”. British Journal of Political Science 27. Cambridge 
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the PTC mandate came to be. But this chapter examines how far Kingdon’s theory can 
take us in understanding the imposition of the PTC mandate.  
Does the PTC Mandate Follow Kingdon’s Model?  
When, how and why was the PTC mandate enacted? Was the timeline for 
installation of this new technology realistic? When, how and why was the installation 
deadline extended? Did the “all-powerful” railroad lobby just make it so? Did the 
pressure to “do something” to enhance rail safety in the shadow of a focusing event (a 
major rail disaster) simply overwhelm logic and reasonable concerns about technical 
feasibility? Yes. 
The below discussion outlines the way in which Congressional action in 
mandating the installation of PTC comports with Kingdon’s theory. It concludes that 
two significant railroad accidents served as focusing events to direct sufficient 
Congressional attention to railroad safety issues. Furthermore, the chapter explores how 
the haphazard congressional reaction fits neatly into Kingdon’s model.  
Who Cares About the Kingdon Model? 
For one thing, the model implies that Congress often makes rash decisions, 
relegating concerns of good governance to secondary status. As long as we are asking 
when Congress acted and why, we should also ask if what they did was wise. For this, 
the paper will consider Douglas Arnold’s model of congressional action, particularly his 
contention that even though citizens might have no policy preferences prior to an issue 
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receiving publicity, legislators anticipate and respond to citizens’ potential policy 
preferences as if they already existed.31 In summary, the chapter will explore how 
Kingdon’s theory helps us understand when Congress acts and why, and Arnold, 
Mayhew and King will help us understand which policies they choose. The unfortunate 
conclusion is that in the wake of focusing events, Congress is likely to act quickly to 
clear an agenda item, typically with little regard for the particulars of the policy.  
The Enactment of the PTC Mandate Fits the Kingdon’s Model 
In the second half of 2008, a bill to reauthorize rail safety programs was moving 
in the Congress—H.R. 2095, the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA).32 Within weeks of 
the Chatsworth accident, the bill was approved by the House and a bicameral 
conference committee was formed. A mandate to "prevent something like Chatsworth 
from ever happening again" (e.g. PTC) was added to the bill in conference with little 
public debate. Regardless of the fact that a distracted commuter train operator caused 
the accident, the freight railroad industry ended up with a $10 billion unfunded 
regulatory mandate.33 To understand the mindset that resulted in this knee-jerk response 
to a perceived crisis, consider Herbert Simon’s comments on a human’s limited capacity 
for attention: “the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is 
required for objectively rational behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable 
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approximation to such rationality.”34 The staffers and members of Congress who 
conceived the PTC mandate were relatively inexperienced with railroad operations, yet 
still they felt compelled to identify and legislate something to solve the perceived 
problem.35 Since the NTSB—a highly regarded entity—had already recommended PTC, 
legislating a mandate was a readily available, seemingly simple solution.36 In short, PTC 
was on the agenda, there was a major rail accident that focused Washington’s attention, 
and the rail industry, despite having a well-organized and well-funded lobbying 
operation, suffered a massive defeat in Washington. 
What is a focusing event? 
Before describing focusing events, we need an understanding of Kingdon’s 
concept of the Congressional agenda. As Kingdon describes it, the Agenda is:  
The list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people 
outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some 
serious attention at any given time. Within the general domain of transportation, 
for instance, the Secretary of Transportation and the members of the 
congressional committees of jurisdiction could be considering, at any given time, 
a range of problems…Out of the set of all conceivable subjects or problems to 
which officials could be paying attention, they do in fact seriously attend to some 
rather than others.37  
An individual member of Congress’s agenda is the result of that member’s a) 
desire to satisfy constituents; b) desire to enhance their intra-Washington reputation, 
such as becoming known as a “heavyweight” who must be taken seriously with regard 
                                                          
34 Simon, Herbert A. Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative 
Organizations. 4th ed. New York: The Free Press. (1997): 196. 
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to a particular subject matter; and c) desire to achieve the member’s conception of good 
public policy.38 Along the same lines, we must also consider the role of outside interest 
groups in contributing to this agenda. Although at times interest groups—including the 
AAR—promote the establishment of new governmental programs, interest groups 
“…are often concerned with protecting current benefits and prerogatives, [and] affect 
the governmental agenda more by blocking potential items than by promoting them.”39 
 The desires of the railroad interests notwithstanding, Kingdon noted the way in 
which the Executive Branch of the federal government develops an agenda for resolving 
problems in the railroad industry, per Congressional direction. He writes that, “in 
addition to routine monitoring, studies are often conducted on a particular problem at a 
given point in time, either by a government agency or by non-governmental researchers 
or academics…a statute mandates a study by the Department of Transportation of the 
problems of the railroad industry, the causes of those problems, and the options that 
might be considered to remedy them.”40 This was true in 2008, just as it was in the 1970s 
and 1980s when Kingdon made this observation.  
 Kingdon proposes that the political agenda is the confluence of three elements: 
the problems identified by the key actors, the solutions proposed, and the political will 
to do something about the problem. Focusing events are the genesis of political will. 
These are the push that gets the attention of people in and around government to take 
action to address an identified problem. Often, the push is, “…an event like a crisis or 
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disaster that comes along to call attention to a problem, a powerful symbol that catches 
on, or the personal experience of a policymaker.”41 In Kingdon’s interviews, he found 
that, “Fully 63 percent of the transportation interviews included the discussion of some 
sort of crises, compared to only 11 percent of the health interviews,” and none of the 
health interviews coded crises as important.42 As one of Kingdon’s interview subjects so 
eloquently put it, “This system responds to crisis. It’s the only thing that it does respond 
to. That’s what politics is all about. It’s the American system; you have to get hit on the 
side of the head before you do something.”43  
 In September 2008, with rail safety already on the Congressional agenda in the 
wake of the Graniteville accident, apparently the Chatsworth accident hit the Congress 
on the side of the head. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Congress reacted like a person with 
a head injury, as it stumbled in a daze towards what it hoped would be a solution.  
The Chatsworth and Graniteville Accidents Were Focusing Events 
 Just as the quail, partridge or pheasant will command a pointing dog’s attention, 
there are many variations of a focusing event that will garner Congressional attention. 
Some focusing events are powerful enough in and of themselves to garner sufficient 
Congressional attention to compel action. One of Kingdon’s respondents thought of the 
collapse of the Penn Central railroad this way. As the respondent put it, “’It was a threat 
to the economy of the nation as a whole. It was horrendous and unthinkable to allow 
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service to stop.’ Such events demand some sort of actions so clearly that even inaction is 
a decision.”44  
Other focusing events are only powerful by virtue of their close association to a 
particular member of Congress. Kingdon cites a lobbyist for biomedical research who 
pointed out that he kept track of which diseases had afflicted the family members of 
certain members of Congress.45 Yet another sort of focusing event is the one that acts as a 
powerful symbol “…there can be symbols for political events and policy proposals as 
well as for problems…such a symbol acts (much as personal experiences) as 
reinforcement for something already taking place and as something that rather 
powerfully focuses attention, rather than as a prime mover in agenda setting.”46  
Finally, Kingdon adds that focusing events must be accompanied by something 
already on the policy agenda. By the time the Chatsworth accident occurred in 
September 2008, the NTSB had had PTC on its “Most Wanted List” for 18 years.47 In 
addition, the Graniteville Accident was still on policymaker’s minds and the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act was moving through the legislative process.48  
What would Kingdon’s model predict if the following criteria were met? 
1. There was a deadly rail accident in a state (California) with one of the largest 
media markets in the nation (a focusing event). Press coverage was 
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immediate, with ghastly images of destruction on the nightly news, on the 
covers of newspapers, and live on the cable networks.  
 
2. California was represented by a pair of powerful, senior Senators: Senators 
Feinstein and Boxer—who sat on the Public Works Committee. In California, 
the Democratic Party’s primary election typically determines the winner of 
the general election. Kingdon would call these Senators “policy 
entrepreneurs,” willing to invest their resources of time, energy and 
reputation in exchange for a policy and/or political return.49 
 
3. Photographs of that rail accident were quickly reproduced in Washington for 
use on the Senate floor, thus drawing public attention to the focusing event.   
 
Answer: Kingdon would anticipate that a rail safety agenda item such as PTC 
would finally see the light of day in the U.S. Congress. And that is exactly what 
happened.  
A Focusing Event Spurs Congressional Action: The September 2008 
Metrolink Railroad Accident, and the Enactment of the 
Unattainable PTC Mandate 
To review, on September 12, 2008, 25 people were killed in a passenger railroad 
accident in Southern California. On January 6, 2005, nine people were killed in a railroad 
accident involving a freight train carrying toxic-by-inhalation chemicals. The NTSB 
reported that both accidents could have been prevented by Positive Train Control.  The 
chapter will now move on to the specifics of the Congressional response and a specific 
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Positive Train Control 
Although billed by its congressional proponents as a simple technological fix,50 
PTC is actually a system of 30 independent technologies. And since PTC is an overlay 
technology, designed to operate seamlessly atop the railroads’ existing dispatching and 
signaling systems, it is also a classic example of a kludge—“an inelegant patch put in 
place to solve an unexpected problem and designed to be backward-compatible with the 
rest of an existing system.”51 Stephen Teles has aptly referred to kludges in the public 
policy context as clumsy solutions. Generally, America’s “Kludgeocracy…makes so 
much of American public policy vexing and wasteful for ordinary citizens and 
governments…[and] makes it so easy for organized interests to profit from the state's 
largesse.”52 However, in the PTC context, the opposite is true. PTC was described as a 
simple, elegant solution to the complex problem of enhancing railroad safety in a way 
that made it easy for the public to understand and support. Meanwhile, the organized 
interest (i.e. the railroads, represented in Washington by the AAR) are responsible for 
the estimated $10 billion cost. In the shadow of a focusing event53 like the Chatsworth 
accident, the AAR was unable to prevent the enactment of a broad PTC mandate.  
Subsequent the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act (RSIA), PTC is 
defined in federal law as a “system designed to prevent train-to-train collisions, 
overspeed derailments, incursions into established work zone limits, and the movement 
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of a train through a switch left in the wrong position.”54 The Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) did not mandate specific technical requirements; instead, it 
provided railroads with the flexibility to adopt the PTC systems best suited to their 
particular needs. However, all PTC systems share certain characteristics, including use 
of radio communication to provide in-cab signals to the train engineer and dispatcher 
ability to stop a train in an emergency.55 In other words, the requirements are designed 
to address the precise characteristics of two rare events: the Chatsworth and Graniteville 
accidents.  
The technical history and specifications of PTC are far beyond the scope of this 
study. Suffice to say the form of radio-controlled PTC mandated by the RSIA was a new, 
unproven technology for the North American rail network.56 The freight railroads 
advised the Congress at the time of enactment that deployment and activation of the 
system by the end of 2015 was likely infeasible. Nevertheless, in the shadow of the 
Chatsworth accident, the Congress enacted the mandate.57  
Kingdon’s theory identifies the potential pitfalls of Congress enacting unripe 
policy, while conceding that just because an idea is not technically feasible does not 
mean its time has not come. As he bluntly puts it, “Even faulty ideas can be trail 
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balloons,”58 though, generally, ideas are ironed out before a proposal is enacted. Even so, 
“attention to the details of implementation does not necessarily result in enacted 
programs that work….to be considered, however, policy makers believe that a proposal 
will work if enacted, even if the idea seems far-fetched in hindsight.”59 Unfortunately, 
sometimes familiarity with a concept or idea can result in an “emerging consensus” that 
can ultimately overcome technical feasibility concerns. In the case of PTC, the NTSB 
consistently added an air of authority and legitimacy to the idea that PTC’s time had 
come. Any time the NTSB referenced the need to install PTC, they pointed to a 1969 
Penn Central commuter railroad accident and stated that the Board has called for PTC 
for “more than 40 years.”60 Never mind that Hanna-Barbera first popularized flying cars 
for more 50 years ago and Toyota still has not come out with a flying 4Runner; on 
Capitol Hill the NTSB is regarded as an expert authority on transportation safety 
technology.61 Additionally, multiple pieces of legislation calling for PTC feasibility 
studies and deployment had been introduced over the previous decade.62 Thus, the 
technology was presumed by key Congressional decision-makers to be ready for prime 
time. Figure 1 below illustrates the timeline of events that led to the enactment of the 
PTC mandate.  
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Figure 1: Timeline of Events Following the Chatsworth Accident63 
  
While policymakers in Congress watched the ink dry on their newly crafted 
mandate, looking forward to a new day in rail safety, the railroad industry felt the 
weight of the multi-billion-dollar mandate and got to work. It was a daunting task, in 
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September 15 Senator Boxer states on her website that she has requested a hearing on 
the collision in Chatsworth. She also asks that the Senate review the 
recently approved RSIA and move up the timetable for requiring 
installation of PTC “in light of this tragic accident.”64 
September 16 An LA Times editorial calls for implementation of PTC, a technology 
“that probably could have prevented the disaster,” and the allocation 
of federal funds to help with the cost of installation to passenger rail 
entities.65 
September 16 Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Senator Boxer (D-CA) introduce 
S. 3493 “that would force railroad companies to install [PTC] systems 
by 2012 in high-risk areas where freight and passenger service mix and 
in all other areas by 2014.”66 
September 18 Congressman Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduces H.R. 6973, a companion 
bill to S. 3493.67 
September 24 House of Representatives, by voice vote, passes the Rail Safety 
Improvement Act of 2008 Conference Report, amended to require 
“PTC installation by 2015 on all rail lines that carry passengers and on 
freight lines that carry hazardous materials.”68 
October 1 Senate passes the conference report and sends the legislation to the 
White House. 
October 16 President Bush signs the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008. 
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the next seven years, to develop and install this new, complex train control system while 
simultaneously ensuring fail-safe interoperability among dozens of carriers and training 
tens of thousands of employees. In December 2010, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) published a report expressing concerns about the ability for the railroad 
industry to meet the 2015 deadline (along with concerns about PTC diverting funding 
from other critical safety needs). GAO’s report acknowledged the railroads were 
attempting to develop and install unproven technologies.69 In January 2012, the AAR, on 
behalf of the railroads, updated the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) on the 
industry’s progress. The AAR reported: 
Since enactment of the RSIA and promulgation of the PTC regulations, the 
railroad industry has devoted enormous resources in an unprecedented effort to 
develop PTC systems and address myriad interoperability issues. However, 
much of the work to implement PTC remains to be done…less than 10 percent of 
Wayside Interface Units (typo?) have been installed, work on switches in non-
signaled territory has been completed for less than 10 percent of the switches that 
need upgrading, only about 10 percent of signal projects have been completed, 
220 MHz radios are not yet in production, and, leaving aside the unavailability of 
the radios, PTC equipment has been partially installed on only 15 percent of the 
locomotives that will need PTC equipment…in no case is the industry close to 
completing the work that must be done…essential software and hardware for 
many components are still under development and testing of these components 
must be performed after the software and hardware are available…the 
interoperability concern has been magnified by current plans for phasing in PTC, 
which instead of providing for the implementation of PTC in less complex areas 
first to reduce operation risk ,actually provide for PTC to be installed first in the 
areas most complex from the perspective of interoperability.70  
 
The White Paper concludes that, “Despite the railroads having spent 
approximately $1.5 billion to develop and install PTC, the December 31, 2015 deadline 
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for implementation of a nationwide interoperable PTC network is unachievable.”71  In 
addition to the FRA, the paper was transmitted to the entire U.S. Congress, including the 
relevant House and Senate committees. The AAR subsequently transmitted annual 
updates each year for 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
By Setting an Unachievable Mandate, Congress Set Itself Up for 
Another Focusing Event. Did Kingdon’s Model Hold True in 
Round Two?  
A Nonsensical Mandate  
In Thank You for Smoking, arguably the finest film about lobbying ever made, the 
son of protagonist Nick Naylor, Vice President of a Big Tobacco lobbying group, asks, 
“Dad, why is the American form of government the best form of government?” Naylor 
instantly replies in his typical deadpan, “Because of our endless appeals system.”72 
Naylor is not only referring to the judicial appeals process, but also the ability for 
entities to seek relief in the regulatory and legislative realms. Naylor does not have to 
think twice about his answer to his son’s question because he knows the beauty of the 
American system, from a lobbyist’s perspective, is that a loss in one branch of 
government can often be rectified or mitigated in another. The day after passage of 
RSIA, the railroads shifted their attention to the rulemaking process at the Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA), which was charged with developing PTC regulations.  
Section 20157 of the PTC statute states that railroads:  
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…shall develop and submit to the Secretary of Transportation a plan for 
implementing a positive train control system by December 31, 2015, governing 
operations on—(A) its main line over which intercity rail passenger 
transportation or commuter rail passenger transportation […] is regularly 
provided; (B) its main line over which poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous 
materials […] is regularly provided; and (C) such other tracks as the Secretary 
may prescribe by regulation or order.” It further states that railroads must, “to 
the extent practical, implement the [PTC] system in a manner that addresses 
areas of greater risk before areas of lesser risk. 73 (emphasis added).  
 
Which additional tracks would the Secretary require be PTC-equipped? Would 
he include train movements in rail yard, for example? What is a greater risk area? Since 
the purpose of the technology is to prevent human-error caused train-train collisions, 
one would imagine “greater risk areas” to be locations where many railroads 
interchange and share tracks. But does it really make sense to require a complicated, 
unproven train control system that relies on interference-prone radio spectrum to be first 
deployed in say, downtown Chicago, rather than a cornfield in Iowa? Surely that would 
not be in the interest of safety. These questions and others were the subject of a 
protracted rulemaking process. The complexity of the rulemaking proceedings and 
uncertainty about which tracks would be included in the PTC mandate could have been 
avoided if those drafting the legislation had more expertise in railroad operations and 
had consulted with industry experts. But due to the nature of the politically-driven 
legislative process (i.e. the imperative to act before the heat of a crisis cools) and 
Congress’s utter lack of expert staff,74 the details of the PTC requirements were left to the 
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FRA, with little regard for the duration of the rulemaking process, while the 
implementation deadline remained in place.  
Over the next five years, the AAR coordinated an effort among its members to 
influence the outcome of the various rulemakings surrounding PTC. For all of its 
bureaucratic inefficiencies and despite the occasional instance of the agency’s politically 
appointed Administrator (at the time a former rail union lobbyist) violating its data-
driven mission, the FRA is generally a well-managed institution, operating independent 
of undue outside influence. This is typical of industry-specific regulatory agencies like 
the FRA’s predecessor agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission.75 The particulars 
of this effort go beyond the scope of this paper, suffice to say there were more than one-
hundred meetings between AAR government affairs, legal and technical staff, and FRA 
staff, during which the AAR presented evidence in support of limiting the mandate.  
Finally, on August 22, 2014, the FRA released its final rule for PTC systems—just 
16 months ahead of the implementation deadline.76 The final rule requires railroads to 
install a PTC system only for track segments carrying freight that present a de minimis 
safety risk, and exempts from the mandate PTC-unequipped freight trains associated 
with certain freight yard operations. It also revises the existing regulations related to en-
route failures of a PTC system, adds new provisions related to other failures of a PTC 
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system, and amends the regulations on applications for approval of certain 
modifications of signal and train control systems.  
For the purposes of this paper, the salient point is that it took the AAR six years 
and millions of dollars of lobbying efforts to convince the FRA to limit the scope of the 
PTC mandate to a reasonable level (e.g. affecting only locations where high-speed, 
catastrophic accidents are likely—not rail yards—and allowing railroads to first 
implement and test PTC in the least complicated operating environments). Had the 
Congress simply given its very technologically prescriptive law due consideration and 
made the boundaries of the mandate clear in the legislative text, millions of dollars and 
years of effort in getting to this point would not have been necessary. Moreover, if the 
law had been well crafted from the start, some aspects of PTC deployment may have 
occurred faster.77  
In the Face of the 2015 Deadline, Officials and Railroaders Alike Faced 
Regulatory Reality, Not Capture  
Before concluding this represents any sort of triumph of industry lobbying, it is 
important to take a sober view of exactly what happened in the FRA rulemaking. For all 
of its success in convincing the FRA to limit the scope of the PTC mandate in certain 
areas, the AAR has not “captured” its regulatory agency.78 The statute provided the 
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Department of Transportation some leeway in identifying other areas that should be 
subject to the mandate, but since Congressional intent was to prevent catastrophic train-
train collisions, extending the mandate to rail yards that contain older locomotives that 
are never used in revenue service simply did not make sense.  
At the same time, it may be true that there is some degree of “cultural capture” of 
the FRA by the AAR. The AAR representatives that presented evidence to the FRA are 
well compensated, have extensive technical expertise in railroad operations and 
regulatory law, and many have previously worked at the FRA. Certainly the parties on 
both sides of the rulemaking “…operate through a set of shared but not explicitly stated 
understandings about the world” 79 of railroad policy. So to the extent that those sitting 
on the FRA’s side of the negotiating table identified with, respected the status of, and 
valued their relationships with the railroad representatives, a degree of cultural capture 
may have contributed to the final outcome.80 That said, the rail industry’s managers 
would not consider the rulemaking process a particular success, since it resulted in a 
protracted period of uncertainty about the final scope of the mandate, all while the 
deadline remained in place.  
While the August 2014 final rule provided clarity in terms of the exact scope of 
the PTC mandate, the December 2015 installation deadline remained unrealistic. Since 
the deadline was statutory, only the Congress could amend it. 
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Dealing with the Deadline  
Returning to the question of the PTC implementation deadline, by 2012 the AAR 
began to publicly call for the enactment of legislation to extend the deadline to a date 
that would allow for appropriate installation and testing of the systems. By being a part 
of the conversation in Washington, rail lobbyists were able to advise members of the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the unrealistic nature of the PTC 
deadline. The AAR’s one-page background paper on PTC that year outlined the 
industry’s efforts to comply with the deadline and the many unforeseen impediments to 
installation. For example, it pointed out that although the railroads had retained 
thousands of additional personnel and begun installing thousands of radio units on 
locomotives, the company developing the software for the braking algorithm that makes 
PTC possible had not even released its beta version of the program yet.   
The Committee Chairman, Rep. John Mica (R-FL), was sympathetic to this 
argument and included language to extend the deadline by five years in his bill to 
reauthorize federal transportation programs. It is possible the PTC deadline extension 
was included so that the rail industry would support the bill, even though it also 
increased the weight limit for trucks on federal highways—a threat to certain categories 
of rail business. However, on the Senate side, Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) had 
long held a grudge against the rail industry.81 He was unwilling to support a PTC 
                                                          




deadline extension unless the bill also included language to artificially cap railroad rates 
for service and mandate certain interchange practices that would benefit a segment of 
rail shippers. Faced with this dilemma and another three years before the actual 
deadline, the rail lobbyists worked with more friendly Senators to convince Chairman 
Rockefeller to drop the rail title of the bill altogether. Thus, lobbying for a PTC deadline 
extension continued.  
It is important to keep in mind that the consequences for operating a railroad 
after the deadline without PTC installed would be extremely serious. The law allowed 
the Secretary of Transportation to impose civil penalties of up to $25,000 per violation, 
per day.  Moreover, where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of violations has 
created an imminent hazard or has caused actual death or injury, a penalty of up to 
$100,000 per violation per day could have been assessed. But the real danger lies in the 
potential for ruinous liability in litigation. The trial bar would likely jump at the chance 
to sue the rail sector for accidents stemming from its inability to implement PTC by the 
2015 deadline.  This threat is constantly on the minds of the railroad managers that make 
up the AAR’s Board of Directors. The task of translating the pace of Washington to non-
lobbyist managers is always difficult82—and is only compounded when the entire 
company could be at risk if acceptable legislation is not enacted. Certainly the rail 
industry’s more than one-hundred years of experience in dealing with Washington came 
into play at this juncture. The AAR’s Board did not penalize the association that year for 
failing its PTC deadline extension objective. The lack of negative consequences is likely a 
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function of the rail management’s extensive understanding of Washington, as well as the 
skill set of President and CEO Ed Hamberger, AAR’s lead lobbyist.83  
In May 2013, the industry received what only a rail lobbyist could call a “gift.” 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) advised the railroads that construction 
of the more than 22,000 antennas necessary to relay PTC radio signals could not proceed 
until further notice. The Commission determined that each of these antennas is subject 
to its environmental and historical review processes and regulations, including the use 
of the FCC’s Tower Construction Notification System, which can only process 
approximately 2,000 antennas construction requests per year.84 Given that the industry 
was still under a mandate to have all of these antennas installed and operational in less 
than two years, the railroads found themselves facing conflicting regulations: one 
federal agency (the FRA) was instructing them to have PTC installed within two years, 
while another agency (the FCC) issued the equivalent of a cease and desist notice, 
instructing them to not install equipment that makes PTC possible.  
The rail lobbyists worked quickly to advise the Congress—including their allies, 
but especially those who doubted the industry’s commitment to safety and PTC in the 
first place—of the conundrum. They informed them of the basic facts of the FCC 
problem and requested assistance in getting the FCC to move faster in approving 
antennas. On August 8, 2013, the Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
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Committee and Ranking Member of its Subcommittee on Communications, which have 
jurisdiction over the FCC, along with the Chairman of the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee and its Railroads Subcommittee, which have jurisdiction over 
the FRA, wrote to the Commissioner of the FCC. The letter outlines the railroads’ 
concerns with the FCC’s process and further states, “It is our understanding that this is 
one of a number of challenges facing the railroads as they attempt to deploy PTC. We 
urge the FCC to move expeditiously to put a process in place to facilitate the timely 
deployment of PTC…we would appreciate periodic updates from you or your staff on 
efforts to resolve this matter.”85 
In many ways, the FCC impediment provided rail lobbyists with a new 
opportunity to enlarge the scope of the conflict in a way that made it impossible for the 
leading proponents of PTC—namely, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the original 
sponsor of the PTC provision—to maintain control of the conversation. In retrospect, it 
actually proved disastrous for their quixotic cause. In addition to the above mentioned 
letter, the industry worked with its allies on Committees outside the confines of 
traditional rail lobbying, such as the Appropriations Subcommittee on Financial Services 
and General Government, which determines funding levels for the FCC. The industry 
worked with Senators on that Committee who were sympathetic to the impossible 
position in which the railroads found themselves. Senators asked FCC Commissioners 
tough questions during budget and confirmation hearings. This upset the balance of 
power and resulted in the FCC eventually admitting there was a problem, and, 
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importantly, more Senators understanding the dilemma the rail industry faced.86 
Although the AAR generally has little interface with these non-transportation 
Committee members, as mentioned above, the railroads remain engaged with members 
representing states where their companies operate. Additionally, Committee 
memberships change over time and the railroads remain engaged year after year.  
The FCC conundrum is also a lesson in the power of expectations; a classic 
example of the utility of the Second Face of power.87 As Schattschneider observed more 
than 50 years ago, if politics is the art of the possible, then power is the art of defining 
the possible. The rail lobby successfully leveraged the FCC’s delays in order to redefine 
“the possible.”88 The argument against extending the PTC deadline—that the railroads 
will not meet the deadline due to negligence on their part—no longer held water on 
Capitol Hill. It also provided an opportunity for rail lobbyists to buck the conventional 
wisdom that it is useless to lobby members of Congress who are unlikely to ever support 
the lobbyist’s cause.89 It is safe to assume there was a lovely hint of spiteful 
Schadenfreude in the air when the railroads met with Senator Feinstein to alert her to 
the FCC issue. She ended up making a phone call to the FCC. 
The PTC struggle also highlights one of the most insidious problems on Capitol 
Hill: the distortion of what is important for elected leaders to spend time on. The 
average American does not care what year PTC is deployed, they just want railroads to 
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be as safe as possible.90 However, members of Congress are extremely risk-adverse and 
have thus far hesitated to repeal this safety mandate, as Arnold observes, “…the same 
citizens who have no opinions about a policy at the time it [was] considered can still 
have a large impact on legislators’ decisions as long as legislators anticipate and respond 
to these citizens’ potential preferences as if they already existed.”91 Mayhew’s theory is 
based on the assumption that reelection is the dominant goal of members of Congress; 
goals related to policy or leadership are secondary.92 Even though Mayhew makes this 
assumption in order to establish an analytical framework, in this case, it appears the 
assumption is correct. If the Congress had simply set a realistic deadline for PTC, or 
better yet, mandated a performance-based safety outcome rather than a prescriptive 
technology, thousands of hours of Congressional time could have been saved.  
Overreactions to Focusing Events Offer Politicians Multiple 
Opportunities for Political Victories  
 
“Politicians often get rewarded for taking positions rather than achieving 
effects.”93 –David Mayhew 
 
Whether or not mandating PTC is good public policy is debatable. The railroads 
argued for years that if they were to spend $10 billion on safety technologies, PTC—
which can only prevent approximately 2% of train accidents94—would not be high on 
the list. In fact in 2011 during a Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing, Cass 
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Sunstein, then-adviser to President Obama at the White House Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, singled out PTC as a rule with costs that are “unambiguously” 
greater than its benefits.95 Although only one railroad has publicly stated that it has had 
to defer maintenance to areas of railroad operations that experience the most accidents 
(tracks and wheels) in order to comply with the PTC mandate, perhaps all would admit 
this privately.96  
What is not debatable is that Congress as an institution is withering on the vine 
(more on this in chapter three), and the poorly conceived PTC legislation and lack of 
action in the face of a looming reality is hurting an industry that makes vital 
contributions to American life. The Class I railroads are Fortune 100 corporations. Unlike 
every other mode of transportation, they neither take nor request a federal subsidy for 
the services they provide. As such, they must raise capital from the private market and 
allocate their resources carefully. The uncertainty surrounding the PTC mandate 
resulted in a tremendously ineffective use of corporate resources; lawyers and lobbyists 
do not move freight. They ride desks, not trains. And as the deadline drew near in the 
latter half of 2015, there were more Wall Street analyst inquiries about efforts to extend 
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Incredibly, Fixing Bad Policy Offers Another Political Victory 
“Passing policy is irrelevant; no one ever got defeated for failing to pass a bill, 
but they do sometimes lose because they are on the wrong side of an issue.”97—
John Bond 
Although the author of this thesis portfolio was not in the room when the PTC 
language was crafted, apparently the FRA advised Senator Feinstein that the industry 
might be able to develop the new technology and install it within ten years (2018). 
Senator Feinstein, sensing a political opportunity to announce that she was “holding the 
railroads’ feet to the fire” on safety, insisted on an unrealistic five-year deadline (2012). 
Thus, Congress settled on a 2015 deadline. This is no way to make smart public policy, 
but it sure does comport with Kingdon’s theory of the importance of acting before the 
halo of the Focusing Event fades. It also fits Arnold’s theory that politicians anticipate 
the likely preferences of the public—in this case, that safer railroads are better sooner 
than later. While rationality certainly has its limits,98 there must be a better way to make 
laws in one of the world’s oldest democracies. In the summer of 2015, with the deadline 
only months away, Senator Feinstein stood firm in opposition to any extension of the 
PTC deadline beyond six months, even though the railroads estimate 2018 is the soonest 
they could have all of the infrastructure installed. Was she hedging against the 
possibility of another PTC-preventable catastrophic railroad accident, or merely playing 
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to an attentive public in California?99  It is likely both. After all, there is a reason she has 
been in public office for more than 40 years.  
As Arnold observes, the public opinion surrounding a vote at a particular time 
does not matter much; but it will matter if an incumbent’s opponent raises the vote just 
before an election. As Fenno puts it, members of Congress in their “mind’s eye” see their 
geographical constituency in terms of some special configuration of the variables of who 
and what exactly makes up the constituency.100 That is, the constituency that the member 
actually worries about is not every single person that lives in the Congressional district. 
Instead, members consider the constituency that will likely pay attention to a particular 
issue or activity. Perhaps part of this constant concern for a particular constituency or 
voting bloc is that American politicians generally think they are more vulnerable than 
they actually are.101 And for the vulnerable American politician, special attention is paid 
to those who might be pleased to see their representative taking strong action on issues 
of public policy—particularly in the afterglow of a focusing event.  
Deadline Extended in the Face of a Second Crisis 
By mid-2015, with the PTC implementation deadline only a few months away, 
Harold Meyerson’s conclusion held true: that just as the American people have a bias for 
action (i.e. mandating rail safety technology after deadly accidents), their government 
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has a bias for stasis.102 However, the AAR was very optimistic that the Congress would 
extend the deadline.103 
After all, despite all of its flaws and lack of staff capacity, the Congress has, in 
recent years, proved it can act in the face of a looming deadline.104 The real question 
facing the Congress in the summer of 2015 was the exact duration of the extension and if 
there would be any other requirements added on. Some Senators suggested requiring 
PTC for any rail lines that carry oil. For the railroad lobby however, the most important 
thing was to be ready to paddle when the proverbial legislative wave arrived in the fall 
of 2015.105 To that end, the AAR participated in discussions with key Committee 
members examining variations of legislative language to extend the deadline. Whether 
the extension hitched a ride on an appropriations bill or a more relevant vehicle, like an 
extension or reauthorization of surface transportation law, mattered little.  
On March 4, 2015, Senators Blunt (R-MO), Thune (R-SD), Nelson (D-FL), and 
McCaskill (D-MO) introduced S. 650, legislation delaying the PTC implementation 
deadline to 2020 with FRA discretion to provide an additional two-year extension.  The 
Senate Commerce Committee approved the legislation by voice vote on March 25, 2015. 
By August 2015, the bill had 12 bipartisan cosponsors and Committee Leadership was 
examining possible next steps in moving the bill forward.  On a separate track, the 
AAR’s Board of Directors met with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) in 
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the spring of 2015 and was assured that the Senate would take up PTC extension 
legislation in one form or another in advance of the December 31st deadline.   
Why did the Committee at last move extension legislation? It may have been the 
result of the AAR’s “intellectual arsenal.” While each PTC conversation, report, white 
paper, panel discussion and op-ed alone may not have convinced anyone of the need to 
extend the deadline, these elements, “…merely [added] to an echo chamber…Hearing 
something enough times, it starts to achieve familiarity. After a while familiarity has a 
ring of truth.”106 Or as Kingdon would argue, familiarity puts the issue on the agenda.  
A False Start 
 Timing is everything in Washington. Just two months after the Senate Committee 
approved the PTC extension legislation, the House appeared poised to act on an 
extension through the appropriations process. In early May of 2015, AAR worked with 
leaders on the House Appropriations Transportation Subcommittee to include a PTC 
deadline extension in the House Transportation-HUD appropriations bill. Tragically, 
however, on May 12, an Amtrak train derailed in Philadelphia, killing 8 people, and 
injuring 200. It was Amtrak’s first deadly accident on the Northeast Corridor since 
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1987.107 The NTSB quickly determined that the accident would have been prevented by 
PTC. Rather than a PTC deadline extension moving, another round of grandstanding 
ensued. Critics of the railroads’ progress on PTC, such as Senate Commerce Committee 
Member Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), issued press statements criticizing efforts to extend 
the deadline in the wake of the Amtrak accident.108 And just two days after the Amtrak 
accident, Senator Feinstein (D-CA) issued a press release stating: 
I’ve worked on this issue since the 2008 Metrolink crash near Chatsworth, Calif., 
which killed 25 and injured 135….The railroad industry has been lobbying 
furiously to delay the mandate, and the Senate Commerce Committee has put 
forward a bill granting a blanket extension for five to seven years. In my view, 
that is an extremely reckless policy… The Amtrak tragedy and other recent 
accidents that could have been prevented by PTC underscore the simple fact that 
further unnecessary delays are unacceptable and irresponsible. I’ll continue the 
fight for the rapid installation of PTC nationwide to prevent more avoidable loss 
of life. 
 Needless to say, the rail industry and the Congress took a strategic pause and 
temporarily abandoned efforts to delay the PTC implementation deadline. Still, the end-
of-year deadline loomed. Despite their feelings of political vulnerability, as of this 
writing, no member of Congress has experienced any negative political outcomes as a 
result of their support of a PTC extension.  
The Deadline Extension 
In September 2015, Senator John Thune (R-SD), Chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee, wrote to each of the railroads that were required to install PTC. 
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His letter requested a progress update on PTC installation and asked for a report on the 
railroads plans for January 2016 if the deadline was not extended. As the replies came in, 
he posted the letters on his committee website. Almost every reply indicated that the 
railroad would be forced to shut down most or all of its operations. In the case of 
passenger railroads, they would be forced to cease operations several days in advance of 
the deadline. In the case of the freight railroads, they would be compelled to begin 
clearing toxic-by-inhalation chemicals from their tracks on or around November 1, in 
order to ensure that all of the chemicals would be off the tracks by the end of the year.  
The railroads also reached out to the customers whose shipments would be 
embargoed. Keep in mind that the railroads do not carry toxic chemicals for the fun of it: 
those chemicals make modern life possible. For example, chlorine is used to purify 
municipal drinking water and anhydrous ammonia is used to manufacture fertilizer. 
The AAR marshaled an effort of the major customers of the railroads, in a joint effort 
with passenger and commuter railroads, to raise the profile of the issue and emphasize 
that waiting until the last minute to extend the deadline would result in a major 
disruption of rail service. A report by the American Chemistry Council, which 
represents the nation’s chemical companies, estimated that, “a rail service disruption 
lasting only one month would pull $30 billion out of the U.S. economy and would 
increase the unemployment rate with a loss of 700,000 jobs. Household incomes would 
fall by over $17 billion, depressing consumer confidence and spending. Vehicle sales 
would be driven down with 175,000 fewer cars sold, and housing starts would stall with 
almost 28,000 fewer homes built—all of which would have dire consequences for a 
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multitude of industries throughout the supply chain.”109 In short, a new focusing event 
took shape: the looming threat of a nationwide rail shutdown that would disrupt the 
nation’s fragile economy and put the nation’s drinking water supplies in jeopardy.  
Just as Kingdon would have predicted, faced with this looming crisis, the 
Congress acted with haste. On September 30, 2015, the “Big 4” bipartisan leaders of the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee introduced H.R. 3651, the Positive 
Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015. The bill took a measured 
but rigorous approach to the PTC issue, directing the Secretary of Transportation to 
review each railroad’s progress, while holding carriers strictly accountable for meeting 
enforceable implementation metrics.  The bill would extend the deadline for PTC 
implementation to the end of 2018; provide the Secretary authority to extend the 
deadline on a case-by-case basis for up to two years beyond 2018, as long as there has 
been a good faith and transparent effort to install the technology; and allow railroads to 
phase in PTC implementation to ensure a safer and smoother testing and evaluation 
process.   
On October 22, 2015, the full T&I Committee approved H.R. 3763, the “Surface 
Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015.”  Among other provisions, the 
bill included the text of the H.R. 3651 (PTC extension). At this point, the PTC issue 
hitched a ride on another crisis issue, an impending funding shortfall in the Highway 
Trust Fund Account (more on this in Chapter 2). On October 27, the House approved by 
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voice vote H.R. 3819, a short-term highway trust fund extension bill containing language 
to extend the PTC deadline. On October 28, the Senate approved the bill under 
unanimous consent. On October 29, President Obama signed the bill into law.110  
The final legislative language is very similar to what the House Committee 
introduced. It provides that within 90 days after enactment, a railroad may file an 
updated PTC implementation plan for approval by the Secretary of Transportation.  
Each plan must lay out a new implementation schedule, including specified milestones 
and metrics, to show that by December 31, 2018 equipment will be fully installed, 
spectrum acquisition will be complete, and system “activation” will occur. The Secretary 
of Transportation is directed to oversee each railroad’s progress, while holding carriers 
strictly accountable for meeting enforceable implementation metrics.  The Secretary is 
able to provide the Secretary authority to extend the deadline on a case-by-case basis for 
up to two years beyond 2018, as long as there has been a good faith and transparent 
effort to install the technology; and allow railroads to phase in PTC implementation to 
ensure a safer and smoother testing and evaluation process.   
It can be tempting to take a cynical view of Congressional activity. One cannot 
overlook the fact that the Senate took further action on October 28, 2015: it approved the 
nomination of Sarah Feinberg to be the Federal Railroad Administrator by unanimous 
consent.111 The nomination was approved shortly after the Senate approved PTC 
extension legislation. In numerous appearances before Congress, Administrator 
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Feinberg stated she did not support a PTC extension and refused to speculate about the 
potential consequences for the rail system and American economy if the deadline was 
not extended. Speaking after both the PTC extension and Feinberg’s nomination cleared 
the Senate, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) stood next to an image of the Amtrak crash and 
stated that the one bright spot in an otherwise disappointing day in the Senate was that 
Administrator Feinberg’s nomination was approved. Boxer added that she was 
heartened that Feinberg had opposed the extension.112  
Conclusion: The Imposition of the PTC Mandate and Its Late-Hour 
Extension Support Kingdon’s Theory of Congressional Action 
 
Kingdon’s theory offers an explanation for when, why, and how Congress makes 
laws, and why decision makers pay attention to one thing rather than another.113 The 
theory assumes that three elements must come together for Congress to act: there must 
be a problem on the agenda, there must be an acceptable solution on the table, and there 
must be political will—often prodded by a Focusing Event—for action to take place. The 
PTC story follows his theory with remarkable precision. PTC (i.e. a rail safety solution) 
had been on the wish list of safety advocates like the NTSB for decades. With a rail 
safety bill already moving (i.e. on the agenda) when a horrendous rail accident occurred 
(i.e. a Focusing Event), the leading politicians in that state enacted the NTSB’s suggested 
solution. Thus, as Kingdon’s theory would predict, the PTC mandate was enacted with 
little debate or consideration for its technical feasibility.  
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Likewise, as Douglas Arnold’s theory holds, those same legislators hesitated in 
extending the deadline, fearing that another PTC-preventable rail accident might occur 
after the extension was enacted. One could certainly argue that the Congress’ collective 
hesitation in extending the PTC implementation deadline, and the reality of the Amtrak 
accident, offers support for Arnold’s theory of congressional action while rationalizing 
the politicians’ extreme caution. As Senator John Danforth of Missouri lamented during 
his first reelection bid, “There’s an absence of a long view: people are running for 
reelection the day they arrive.”114 
So why do decision-makers pay attention to one thing rather than another? Why 
do they either overreact or do nothing? It is because when experiencing the duress of a 
crisis, in their mind’s eye, not acting is as just as much of an action as acting. Therefore, 
their tendency for stasis is overcome by a desire to do something to resolve the crisis. 
They have two reasons for acting this way: the potential for political benefit for leading 
on an issue of critical importance, and—perhaps more importantly—the potential to be 
punished politically for failing to lead during a crisis.  
The next chapter examines whether or not Kingdon’s theory holds up under the 
opposite scenario: when Congress does not act.  
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Congress Doing Nothing:  
Its Refusal to Increase Federal Truck Weight Limits and Inaction on 
Federal Excise Taxes on Gasoline 
 
Scholarly research on when, how and why Congress acts on public policy issues 
is extensive. And for good reason; the legislative process in the U.S. Congress is 
comprised of a series of barriers to action.115 It makes sense to frame questions of 
Congressional activity from a perspective that focuses on when the body actually moves 
on policy. But in order to have a complete understanding of the institution, we should 
also concern ourselves with when Congress does not take action on public policy issues. 
What factors exist to discourage collective action in the chamber? When addressing 
Congressional activity from this perspective, it is especially interesting to consider why 
Congress does not act even when pressured by strong outside interests to do so.  
This chapter turns from significant Congressional action related to railroad safety 
policy to examine Congressional inaction on two issues related to federal highway 
transportation policy. Specifically, it will make sense of why the Congress did not 
increase the statutory weight limit of trucks on federal highways, despite strong 
pressure from an array of well organized outside interest groups. It will also outline and 
analyze the extent to which the Congress has failed to increase the federal gas tax, or 
identify another permanent funding source, to pay for surface transportation programs, 
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despite the steep decline in the purchasing power of the tax, which is not indexed for 
inflation.116 It concludes that Congressional inaction on these aspects of federal 
transportation policy is due to two factors: 1) the extent to which members of congress 
seek to minimize political risk and 2) the lack of a major event to focus Congress’s 
attention on the need to address this policy area.  
In the background of this discussion is an untenable policy landscape, which 
makes Congressional inaction quite remarkable. Since the gas tax collects monies for 
federal, the federal trust fund that pays for surface transportation programs has faced 
continual funding shortfalls for the better part of a decade. As a result, the size federal 
surface transportation program as a whole, in terms of federal financial investment, has 
remained nearly unchanged since 2005. 117 Given that 1) most Americans are impacted 
by the state of the American transportation system on a daily basis, and 2) in previous 
decades, members of Congress from both parties supported both gas tax increases and 
surface transportation authorization legislation, it is at first glance hard to understand 
the refusal to act on this policy.118 Likewise, given that federal truck weight limits have 
remained the same for more than twenty years,119 and increasing the limits has been a 
legislative priority of a wide range of well organized interest groups, Congressional 
inaction is notable.  
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This chapter, in essence, provides new evidence of the merit of John Kingdon’s 
theory of Congressional activity. Kingdon’s theory states that the Congress is unlikely to 
take significant policy action in the absence of a focusing event: a major, public event that 
focuses the nation’s attention on a particular policy area.120 As Kingdon deftly describes 
an aspect of Congress’s status quo bias it in a discussion of the debate surrounding 
whether or not truckers pay their fair share for highway usage. He writes, “Problems are 
not self-evident by the [factual] indicators,” no matter how obvious they may be to those 
interested in policy change. 121  
In order to conduct a methodical exploration of this subject, this chapter is 
structured as follows. First, it will briefly review the Kingdon theory outlined in the 
previous chapter. Then it will explore how leading theories of Congressional activity 
offer support for the Kingdon theory and how the truck weight and gas tax policy 
situations are recent confirmations of the veracity of the thirty-year-old theory. 
Additionally, to provide context for how decisions are made in Congress, this review 
includes a brief overview of the federal system and also observes the high level of 
political vulnerability felt by American politicians.  
Next, the chapter examines how a discrete policy outcome bolsters the Kingdon 
theory: Congressional inaction on raising federal truck weight limits in spite of pressure 
from strong interest groups. Then, the chapter examines how Kingdon’s theory accounts 
for long-term Congressional inaction on federal excise taxes on gasoline. Finally, it 
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determines that even though inaction on these issues may be frustrating to large 
segments of the American public and some interest groups, the status quo will likely 
persist until there is a focusing event.  
The current political and policy situation offers no guarantee that there will be a 
focusing event to spur Congressional action in the coming years. Of course, something 
could happen to motivate the Congress to act, but unfortunately it will not be a sudden 
wave of altruism. As this chapter demonstrates, Kingdon’s theory has proved accurate 
over the years. And the theory holds that for there to be Congressional action on 
transportation policy, there will probably have to be a major transportation catastrophe 
related to a lack of infrastructure investment that pushes the Congress towards an 
acceptable, readily-available policy solution to fund new infrastructure improvements.122 
If that does not occur, perhaps a looming Highway Trust Fund “fiscal cliff” in 2020 will 
in and of itself serve as a focusing event. In other words, the implications for this theory 
are that it looks more and more like either some people have to die, or our highway trust 
fund has to go completely bankrupt before the Congress will take decisive action.  
What Makes Congress Not Act? A Review of Literature on 
Congressional Action 
When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at 
variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have 
appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary 
delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate 
reflection. Instances might be cited, in which a conduct of this kind has saved the 
people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and has procured 
lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men, who had courage and 
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magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure.123 –
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 71.  
Consider the structure of Congress and federal system itself. Before criticizing 
the Congress for failing to identify a sustainable funding source for surface 
transportation programs, or keeping truck weight limits the same for decades, one 
should ask whether that is even fair criticism. After all, as the Federalist Papers point 
out, the Congress was literally designed to make action slow in order to protect people 
from their own excessive passions. By design, House members are so regularly up for 
election that they are made to always feel politically vulnerable always. Indeed, there is 
a strong argument that a politician’s concerns about electoral vulnerability related to the 
potential dangers of increasing truck weights or raising a regressive tax is a desirable 
feature—not a flaw—of the American political system. So in that case, the 
Transportation Committee’s rejection of increasing truck weights (i.e. inaction on that 
policy from the perspective of proponents of changing the limits) can be interpreted as a 
result of members of Congress who specialize in transportation policy trying to do the 
best thing for the people they represent, ignoring the impassioned pleas of a few.  
The Vulnerable American Politician 
American politicians, particularly members of the House of Representatives, face 
incredibly frequent elections. The time period from when they are sworn in to their 
primary election is often less than 18 months. The truck weight vote examined below 
was held in the early part of an election year, just a few months before a number of 
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primary elections. It is no surprise that these politicians had a hard time with this 
decision—such a difficult time that some skipped the vote entirely. Anthony King 
observes that the difficulty in taking tough decisions is a function of the extreme feelings 
of vulnerability among American politicians.124 And as Doug Arnold points out, the 
public opinion surrounding a vote at a particular time does not matter much. But it will 
matter if an incumbent’s opponent raises the vote just before an election. 125 
Members of Congress are well aware of their perilous political situation. This 
makes them cautious actors. It also makes them pay attention when people who care 
deeply about a particular issue above all others lobby for Congressional action. As 
Richard Fenno observes, members of Congress in their mind’s eye see their geographical 
constituency in terms of some special configuration of the variables of whom and what 
exactly makes up the constituency.126 In other words, when people become vocal and 
agitated about a particular issue, politicians are likely to pay attention to that group, if 
they assume members of that group are likely to vote and share their views with other 
voters.  
The Influence of Organized Interests  
Along these same lines, work by E.E. Schatchneider emphasizes the degree to 
which the strategic activities of those seeking to influence congressional activity can 
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make a difference. He finds that, “conflicts are frequently won or lost by the success that 
the contestants have in getting the audience involved in the fight or in excluding it, as 
the case may be.”127 That is, if organized interests are able expand the playing field of 
people interested in a particular subject; it can tilt the political calculus even further to 
the side of caution. This strikes at the notion of organized lobbying being as much about 
determining what gets on the Congressional agenda, rather than taking sides on an 
agenda that Congress sets for itself. As Baumgartner observes, “Lobbying may have a 
stronger impact on the agenda-setting stage of the policy process, when government 
officials determine which issues merit significant attention and which issues can be 
safely ignored. Attention is a critical but limited resource in the policymaking process. 
Government officials have a limited amount of attention to devote to different policy 
problems.”128 This supports the element of Kingdon’s theory that a topic is most likely to 
get on the Congressional agenda if there is an event to focus public and political 
attention on it. An organized lobby can attempt to create these focusing events, or raise 
the profile of issues through a coordinated campaign, but for Congress to take major 
action on an issue, there is rarely a substitute for a true focusing event.129  
Of course, the implication of this theory is that the Congressional agenda and 
Congressional activity are not determined by Madison’s “median voter.”130 Nor is the 
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agenda and related activity the happy ground between the various factions of American 
society. Instead, under the Kingdon model, Congress acts more like a curious raccoon: if 
there is a shiny snare in a forest of drab, the raccoon puts its hand in the snare. And once 
it finds itself trapped, it fights like hell to get out of the dangerous situation, with the 
likely result being irrational and sudden movements that only tighten the noose.  
How do politicians in a majoritarian democracy manage to win elections despite 
ignoring pressing public policy issues? The enterprising research of Gilens and Page 
sheds light on this phenomenon. Using a sophisticated technique for measuring the 
influence of elites in American politics, they find empirical evidence that in the United 
States, the majority does not rule—at least not in the causal sense of actually 
determining policy outcomes. In fact, “When a majority of citizens disagrees with 
economic elites or with organized interests, they generally lose. Moreover because of the 
strong status quo bias built into the U.S. political system, even when fairly large 
majorities of Americans favor policy change, they generally do not get it.”131 This means 
that these extremely vulnerable politicians are best served by catering to the desires of 
organized interests most of the time. But that calculus is reversed if an issue becomes top 
of mind among the public, as is the case in the wake of a focusing event.  
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The Status Quo Bias and Congress Reflecting Human Nature 
In the background of this entire discussion, one must remember that Congress as 
an institution, and at the individual actor level, has a bias for the policy status quo. As 
Frank Baumgartner explains, “Arguments for change generally are harder to make than 
are arguments in favor of the status quo…those seeking to protect the status quo 
maintain numerous tactical advantages over those proposing changes.”132 
While the Kingdon theory is largely focused on the individual choices of actors 
within Congress, an evaluation of his theory must also keep in mind that the Congress is 
a bureaucratic organization. Research by Bryan Jones indicates that, “…the paradox of 
organizations is that they provide stability, thus allowing people to coordinate their 
actions to achieve their goals, but they also must be adaptable in the face of changing 
circumstances, thus disrupting the stability they provide.”133 Just as organizations like 
Congress provide a venue for a stable framework for collective action, getting to the 
action part is not necessarily a smooth or efficient process. Jones writes that, “…In most 
situations, human behavior is not consistently maladaptive. But it is often adaptive in an 
episodic and disjointed manner. Disjointed adaptations are so characteristic of human 
action that a single explanation is warranted. That explanation lies in the tension 
between goal-oriented adaptation and certain biological bounds on human abilities to 
adapt.” Jones explains that human behavior is mostly goal-oriented. However, it often 
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lacks clear pathways to achieving its goals, other than the overarching goal of political 
survival for each individual member.  
Kingdon would point out that focusing events allow the public and Congress to 
direct their attention and efforts to a particular goal. Jones also writes that due to 
biological limitations, “…humans are disproportionate information processors [and] the 
formal organizations created by humans aid in adaptation by overcoming inherited 
limitations in adaptive abilities…[yet,] some of our limitations in adaptability will show 
through in even the most rational of institutions.” The result is that our institutions—
including Congress—will not react proportionately to incoming information, and 
outputs from the most rational of institutions will be disjointed and episodic.”134 
Kingdon would call these disjointed, episodic outputs over-reactions to focusing events.  
Criticisms of Kingdon’s Theory 
Kingdon’s theory is criticized for not being an effective general theory of 
Congressional agenda-setting and activity because it is too dismissive of rational-actor 
and incrementalist models. In fact, Anthony King argues that Kingdon’s theory amounts 
to simply, “a long check-list of factors that a social scientist interested in a specific 
instance of agenda-setting is advised to keep an eye out for.” But for the purposes of 
someone interested in understanding, predicting and even influencing Congress, such a 
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checklist seems to be the perfect tool.135 Certainly the most important question we must 
answer in evaluating a social science theory is whether or not it holds any predictive 
power. If the theory helps an interested person predict likely outcomes with a high level 
of accuracy, the theory is valid and useful. As the following discussion demonstrates, 
Kingdon’s model would accurately forecast how and why Congress collectively rejected 
making changes to two fundamental aspects of federal transportation policy. 
Furthermore, Kingdon’s theory is supported by his critic (King’s) own theory that much 
of an individual Congressman’s activity can be best understood by keeping in mind the 
extent to which American politicians are politically vulnerable.  
Below is a second test of Kingdon’s theory against two aspects of transportation 
policy. 
Part 1: A Key Committee Overrules its Chairman and Refuses to 
Increase Truck Weight Limits 
 
On February 2, 2012, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee 
held a markup of H.R. 7, a bill to reauthorize federal surface transportation programs. 
Less than 48 hours earlier, the text of the bill was released to the public for the first time. 
While close observers thought an amendment to modify federal truck weight limits 
might be considered during the markup, most were shocked that the base text of the bill 
essentially included the trucking industry’s wish list.  
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The text of the bill amends federal highway rules to allow for both longer and 
heavier truck trailers, as well as multiple-trailer combinations. The trucking industry 
and its supporters had followed one of Schattschneider’s basic rules, which states that, 
“A tremendous amount of conflict is controlled by keeping it so private that it is almost 
invisible.”136 By releasing the final bill language at the eleventh hour, opponents of truck 
weight changes faced long odds and the pro-truck weight increase coalition made 
significant progress in overcoming institutional status quo bias. However, a coalition 
organized in opposition to truck weight changes spent years preparing for this fight. 
And despite being faced with a tactical disadvantage of needing to amend the text of the 
base bill to win the fight, the railroad industry and its allied groups under the umbrella 
of the Coalition Against Bigger Trucks (CABT) won. The truck weight language was 
stricken from the bill and replaced with a study of truck weight issues, by an 
overwhelming Committee vote of 33-22.  
Truck Weight Increase Opponents Expand the Conflict and Raise the Prospect 
of Electoral Risk 
As Schattschneider observed, “it is the loser who calls for outside help”.137 
Having lost the initial battle to keep these changes out of the base bill text, CABT called 
for outside help. First, anticipating the possibility of a truck size and weight fight, the 
coalition commissioned public polling in late 2011.138 The survey found that voters 
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"overwhelmingly and consistently oppose allowing bigger, heavier trucks on American 
highways," with nearly three quarters of registered voters opposing such an increase, 
and half of those surveyed saying they strongly oppose the idea. These survey results 
were widely publicized via a press release and blast email to Congressional staff, wire 
services and major news outlets the day before the markup.139 Thus, CABT expanded the 
scope of the issue from a narrow issue of trucking regulations to an issue of public 
safety, for which the public held strong opinions. In doing so, they played on the 
vulnerability of members of Congress by raising prospect of electoral risk for any 
member supporting heavier trucks.  
Meanwhile, CABT ran advertisements on TV stations in the Congressional 
districts of Committee members. The ads showed the type of bigger and heavier truck 
configurations that would have been legalized by the legislation, weaving in and out of 
traffic and losing control on public highways. The ad ended with a message urging to 
the viewer to contact Congress to express opposition to bigger and heavier trucks. This 
greatly expanded the scope of the issue, as voters in the home districts of Committee 
members were informed of the public policy question—framed by opponents of the 
increase—and began contacting their Representatives. As Schattschneider observes, “the 
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expansion of the conflict may have consequences that are extremely distasteful to the 
original participants.”140 No politician enjoys fielding angry calls from likely voters.   
CABT then took it to the next level: they called in the State Troopers. Few 
coalitions carry more weight in Washington, D.C. than law enforcement, and few people 
in our society know more about the impacts of highway accidents than the State 
Troopers who respond to them. CABT began collaborating with Trooper organizations 
years in advance, but did not activate the group until the fight was on. Dozens of State 
Troopers called their local Congressmen the day before the markup, and several even 
flew to Washington to meet with Committee members in-person. In discussions after the 
markup, several Committee members admitted that more than anything else, a visit 
from the head of their state’s trooper association helped inform their decision to oppose 
the truck weight limit changes.141 In fact, the day after the markup, the head of the 
American Trucking Associations contacted CABT and offered a truce: “call off the 
Troopers and stop running those damn ads, and we won’t fight this any more this 
year.”142  
Schattschneider argues that, “conflicts are frequently won or lost by the success 
that the contestants have in getting the audience involved in the fight or in excluding it, 
as the case may be.”143 In this case, Schattschneider’s hypothesis appears to be accurate 
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because expanding the conflict to safety issues changed the Committee’s collective 
political calculation. Today the 80,000 lb. federal truck weight limit and 53 foot trailer 
length limit remain in place thanks in large part to this age old political truism.  
Additionally, several major organized labor unions publicly opposed truck 
weight increases.144 We can assume labor’s position must have helped firm up 
opposition among many of the Democrats, since “despite repeated claims of non-
partisanship, organized labor has been one of the most partisan interest groups in 
American politics. The labor movement has historically had the closest and most 
enduring relationship with the Democratic Party of any organized constituency.”145 
Taking a position contrary to major organized labor interests can increase a Democrat’s 
political vulnerability.   
Kingdon theorizes that the political agenda is determined by three core elements: 
the problems identified by the key actors, the solutions proposed, and the political will 
to do something about the problem. 146 The trucking coalition identified the problem 
(weight limits that hurt their business) and proposed a solution (increasing the weight 
limit). However, the combination of negative polling, local television advertising, and 
visits from highway patrol officers diminished the political will of the House members 
to support the change.  
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Truck Weight Increase Supporters Are a Powerful Constituency but Cannot 
Overcome Concerns of Political Vulnerability 
Supporters of increasing truck weight limits established “The Coalition for 
Transportation Productivity.” The Coalition described itself as representing, “More than 
70 of the nation’s leading food and agriculture associations– including the American 
Farm Bureau, American Fruit and Vegetable Processors and Growers Coalition, 
American Soybean Association, International Dairy Foods Association, National 
Cattlemen's Beef Association, National Grain and Feed Association, and the National 
Farmers Union.”147 They argued that, “Federal weight limits have been stalled for more 
than 25 years,” and it is time to modernize trucking regulations. Their primary claim 
was that by increasing the weight of trucks, there would be fewer total truck trips to 
carry the same amount of freight. Their materials state the “80,000 lb. limit is arbitrary 
and challenges our safety, economy, environment and infrastructure, as companies 
shipping heavy goods must make more trips than necessary because their trucks hit the 
weight limit with significant space in the trailer.”  
The further argued, “Fewer shipments improves efficiency, making American 
companies more productive and competitive… [and] freight hauled by trucks is 
expected to double by 2025.” Additionally, in order to push back against concerns of 
additional infrastructure damage, they recommended adding a sixth axle to heavier 
truck trailers to “spread out” the weight of the load. By increasing the weight limit to 
97,000 lbs., the nation would, “save 2 billion gallons of gas per year and cut emissions 
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19% per ton mile.” Finally, they argued heaviest trucks would enhance safety, since 
there would be fewer total trucks on the road. Their handout presented to Congressional 
office stated that, “…since the UK increased its weight limit to 97k in 2001, fatal truck-
related accidents are down 35%.” They offered to pay slightly more in diesel fuel and 
tire taxes as a part of their proposal.148  
Kingdon would point out that even though enhancements to truck productivity 
are top of mind among this segment of American industry, a few calls from the local 
Farm Bureau and meetings with lobbyists representing trucking interests hardly amount 
to a focusing event. Under Kingdon’s theory, the Congress will only act on truck weight 
policy if attention is so focused on that issue that the benefits of increasing the weight 
limits overshadow voter concerns about highway safety. As Kingdon would put it, it is 
one thing to use one’s political influence to get an issue on the Congressional agenda, it 
is quite another for the Congress to act on the issue favorably.149  
One would assume this group, representing a broad swath of the American 
economy, might have fared better. But influence in Congress is divided by the 
Committee system. The main venue for legislation affecting most of the group’s 
members is the Agriculture Committee; whereas, the main venue for the CABT’s 
primary members—safety groups and the railroads—is the Transportation Committee. 
Most of the CTP’s members’ political efforts and strongest relationships are therefore on 
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the Agriculture Committee and most of the CABT’s members’ strongest relationships 
are with the Transportation Committee. How might that have affected the outcome? 
House Transportation Committee Action 
As the Figure 2  below outlines, both sides of the truck weight issue worked with 
members of the House and Senate to introduce legislation. Members supportive of 
heavier trucks introduced bills to allow states the option to increase weight limits on 
highways within their borders. Opponents of heavier trucks introduced legislation to 
mandate an 80,000 lb. weight limit nationwide (eliminating heavier weight exemptions 
in several states). The lobbyists representing these interests then communicated their 













Figure 2: Truck Weight Limit Increase Bills and Activity in the 112th 
Congress150 
Spring 2011: Supporters 





Supporter Bill Heavier Trucks:  
H.R. 763, Safe and Efficient 
Transportation Act of 2011 
Rep. Michaud (D-ME); 2/18/11; 61 
cosponsors; allows states to increase 
weight limit to 97,000 lbs. 
Supporter Bill Heavier Trucks:  
S. 747, Safe and Efficient 
Transportation Act of 2011 
Sen. Crapo (R-ID); 4/6/2011; 5 
cosponsors; allows states to increase 
weight to 97,000 lbs.  
Opponent Bill Weight Freeze:  
H.R. 1547, Safe Highways 
and Infrastructure 
Preservation Act 
Rep. McGovern (D-MA); 4/18/11; 61 
cosponsors; prohibits any weight 
increases 
Opponent Bill Weight Freeze:  
S. 876, Safe Highways and 
Infrastructure Preservation 
Act 
Sen. Lautenberg (D-NJ); 5/3/2011; 4 
cosponsors; prohibits any weight 
increases 
Summer and Fall 2011:  
Aggressive Lobbying 
and Campaign Support 
Ensues 
Throughout 2011, both sides 
take their message to Capitol 
Hill and contribute to the 
campaigns of incumbents 
supportive of their positions.  
 





H.R. 7, American Energy and 
Infrastructure Jobs Act, 
Chairman Mica (R-FL) 
Includes legislative text of H.R. 
763/S. 747, to allow states to increase 
truck weight limits to 97,000 lbs.  




Rep. Barletta (R-PA) offers 
amendment to strike truck 
weight provisions and 
replace with a Federal 
Highway Administration 
study of truck weight/length 
issues.  
Barletta amendment wins 33-22. The 
markup lasts 14 hours.151  
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Feb. 9, 2012:  
Truce Between Railroad 
and Trucking Interests 
Railroad Subcommittee 
Chairman (and future Full 
Committee Chairman) Bill 
Shuster (R-PA) brokers an 
agreement between the two 
sides so that there is not a 
destructive floor fight on the 
issue. 
Association of American Railroads 
and American Trucking Associations 
sign agreement to oppose any floor 
amendments that would modify any 
of the truck size and weight 
provisions in the bill that was 
reported out of the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee on February 3rd. 
July 6, 2012, Moving 
Ahead for Progress in 
the 21st Century Act 
(MAP-21; PL 112-141) 
signed into law by 
President Obama  
Senate bill did not include 
truck weight increase 
provisions. The Barletta 
study was shortened to two-
years (the length of the bill). 
Final Outcome: federal truck weight 
limits were not increased. The status 
quo was maintained, a victory for 
safety advocates and the railroad 
industry. 
 
Members of Congress often seek seats on particular committees because they 
have a special interest in the issues under the Committee’s jurisdiction. This self-
selection process may result in Committee memberships that are not representative of 
the broader institution, and theoretically by extension, the nation as a whole.152 Given 
widespread public opposition to truck weight increases, perhaps this self-selection 
theory explains the Chairman’s decision to include provisions to increase truck weights 
in his bill, since he could claim credit for the bill as a whole if it passed. The Kingdon 
theory assumes that those with influence are able to get things on the agenda. The 
theory also holds that Congress will not act on an issue in a way that increases political 
vulnerability if the public is paying attention. As a result, the same factors that led the 
Chairman to include the trucking industry’s proposal in his bill also explains why most 
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of the Committee members rejected it, since they could be more easily targeted for their 
vote on a particular amendment.  
In February 2012, there was a vote in the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee on the truck weight issue. Truck weight increase supporters 
enjoyed an early victory, as the Chairman of the Committee, Rep. John Mica (R-FL) 
included the truck weight increase in his initial draft of the bill. However, Rep. Lou 
Barletta (R-PA) along with Rep. Jerry Costello (D-IL) introduced an amendment to strike 
those provisions and replace them with a requirement that the Federal Highway 
Administration conduct a three-year study of the effects of heavier trucks on 
infrastructure. After contentious debate among Committee members, the amendment 
was carried 33-22. In a profile in courage—demonstrative of American Congressmen’s 
recognition of their political vulnerability--four members who had been present for 
previous votes stepped out of the Committee room and “just happened” to miss the 
vote.  
 On the Senate side, truck weight provisions were not included in the bill; 
however, during the House/Senate conference to reconcile differences between the two 
chambers’ transportation bills, the House provision mandating a three-year Department 
of Transportation study of the potential impact of allowing increased truck size and 
weight configurations was shortened to two years. The final study results were released 
in April 2016. The report states the DOT cannot recommend any changes to truck weight 
limits due to study and data limitations. It notes the DOT, “…did not seek to satisfy the 
policy question as to whether a change in allowable truck sizes or weights would yield 
74 
 
positive impacts that could outweigh negative impacts.”153 Thus, the status quo is 
maintained. 
Part 2: Inaction on the Gas Tax 
On August 10, 1993, President Clinton signed the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act, which increased the gas tax by 4.3 cents, for a total of 18.4 cents per 
gallon. It has remained 18.4 cents per gallon exactly since then—it is not indexed for 
inflation.154 Gas taxes are not an ordinary tax; they are a user fee. That is, all of the funds 
collected are deposited into the federal Highway Trust Fund. All of the funds are then 
used to support transportation projects, primarily highway construction and 
maintenance. A full discussion of Congressional inaction on raising the federal gas tax 
exceeds the confines of this discussion. Instead, the following is an exploration of 
whether John Kingdon’s theory of Congressional action explains the status of the gas 
tax. Kingdon posits that it normally takes a focusing event to motivate Congress to take 
action on something.155 Has Congress not acted to raise the gas tax because there has not 
been a focusing event?  
Vulnerable Politicians Avoid Political Risk 
The roots of today’s transportation funding struggles go back two decades, when 
conservative, anti-tax activists came to prominence in Republican leadership circles. In 
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the early 1990s, “…groups that helped bring the Republicans to power in 
congress…came to exert unprecedented influence on Capitol Hill as power 
players…Former House Majority Leader Tom Delay (TX) and conservative strategist 
Grover Norquist, who coordinate[d] the activities of the Leave Us Alone Coalition, 
sought to transfer the record levels of partisanship within the halls of Congress in the 
mid-nineties beyond the ideological groups that formed the party’s base to the large 
world of lobbying and group politics.”156 The mission of these groups is simple: do not 
raise any taxes, ever. The government is already too large and the people are already 
over-taxed. Today, Norquist’s group is known as “Taxpayers for Common Sense.” They 
vehemently oppose any and all tax increases, including increases to the gas tax.157  
Perhaps some of the Congressional gridlock and inaction related to surface 
transportation policy can be explained by how few members of Congress today come 
from districts that are heterogeneous in terms of their partisan makeup. In this electoral 
context, why would a Republican Congressman take a political risk by increasing the 
gas tax—a regressive tax that nearly all of his constituents will be hit with—when his 
likely challenge will only come from the right?  
Twenty years before the Norquist tax pledge, David Mayhew observed that 
when there are fewer marginal districts, there are fewer incumbent losses during 
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national mood swings.158 That is, the changes in majority party will result in fewer swing 
votes in the Congress. On the Republican side, perhaps that means there will be fewer 
representatives who will feel no need to associate with the Norquist crowd and therefore 
might be willing to support a gas tax increase. Relatedly, Mayhew recognized the trend 
of incumbency becoming a source of ever-increasing electoral power.159 As he put it, 
“…the House seat swing is a phenomenon of fast declining amplitude and therefore of 
fast declining significance.”160 His conclusion more than 40 years ago was that if the 
trend continues, we will witness the continuation of, “the blunting of a blunt 
instrument…a weakening of the peculiar links that party has supplied between 
electorate and government.”161 It seems his prediction was correct: in the 2014 elections, 
more than 90% of incumbents were reelected, which has been the norm for elections in 
this century.162 
Moreover, with fewer marginal seats in play, the big wave elections, such as 
1994, 2006 and 2010 are typically strong enough to knock off all of the moderate 
members of one party or another. It is theoretically impossible during a wave election 
for moderates from both parties to be elected at the same time, and the minority party 
will always be more polarized in its policy views. Perhaps it is not that there are not 
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very many moderate Republicans and Democrats who might find a way forward on 
transportation policy; it is that they just will never meet in the House or Senate 
chamber.163  
John Kingdon’s work points out that federal inaction on transportation issues, 
contrary to popular belief, has long been the norm in American politics. He notes that 
the federal government got involved with the construction and maintenance of public 
roads incrementally, not by a focusing event.  While the ever-vulnerable feeling 
members of the U.S. Congress are unlikely to take action on a policy matter in the 
absence of a focusing event, they are likely to allow programs to grow on their own, 
little by little. Kingdon notes that “If a program has basically settled down into a stable 
pattern, for instance, few questions are raised about it, there is little controversy 
surrounding it, and whatever changes that do occur are modest…For instance, federal 
highway funds were traditionally spent only for new construction.”164  
The trouble with roads, of course, is that they deteriorate over time. Almost 
everyone in America uses the road system, so the need for maintenance becomes 
obvious to everyone. As a result, “The federal government gradually got into [roadway] 
maintenance…” rather than only supporting the construction of new roads. Federal 
authorities, “…gradually got into the maintenance business, not by suddenly declaring 
that they would do so but by gradually defining more maintenance activities as 
construction: replacement, then rehabilitation, then resurfacing, then bridge repair. But 
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‘they didn’t really come out and call it maintenance,’ in the words of one lobbyist.” 
Kingdon interviewed dozens of Congressional staffers and industry lobbyists, quizzing 
them on this issue. He noted that, “By the late 1970s when I asked whether the federal 
government actually was financing maintenance, one congressional staffer replied, ‘I 
think we crossed that watershed a year or two ago.’”165 
It is worth noting that back in the early 1980s, Kingdon even identified the truck 
weight issue: “Much of the discussion of equity in transportation concerns comparisons 
across the various modes. Railroads complain that waterways have an unfair 
disadvantage because of the free use of the Corps of Engineers’ navigation projects, and 
they claim that truckers are not paying their fair share of highway construction and 
maintenance.”166 It seems that at least in terms of transportation policy, the same fights 
are likely to continue for decades, with few opportunities for major action or policy 
resolution in sight.  
Gas Tax Struggles Are Not New 
In June 1982, National Journal ran what is now a familiar cover story entitled “Our 
Crumbling Highways.” In it, the magazine observes that, “The federal gasoline tax was 
raised from 3 cents a gallon to 4 cents in 1984; that provided the highway trust fund with 
sufficient funds for nearly 20 years as the number of autos climbed and gasoline use 
soared. It has only been in the past few years that the combination of fuel conservation 
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and inflation in construction costs has eaten away at the fund’s healthy surplus.”167 Since 
that time, inaction has been the dominant theme in highway funding policy. Rather than 
a complete accounting of Congressional inaction on highway funding beyond basic 
oversight, the following is a discussion of several major events that demonstrate the 
Congress’s inclination to avoid making major decisions in the absence of a publicly 
visible crisis.  
In 1998, a Machiavellian jurisdictional grab by House Transportation Committee 
Chairman Bud Shuster (R-PA) established a “common law” precedent in the TEA21 bill 
that circumvented the Budget and Appropriations Committees by tying highway trust 
fund spending levels directly to Trust Fund tax receipts. 168  This was great for the 
Chairman, who at that time had the ability to direct a portion of the spending to 
particular projects in order to obtain the support of members to pass the bill. But it also 
set a precedent that would allow future Congresses to ignore the need to raise the gas 
tax. Specifically, TEA21 (PL 105-178) set up a budgeting mechanism that added or 
subtracted highway dollars available for construction projects based on the estimates of 
future gas tax receipts. However, three years later, “…the Bush Administration dropped 
a bomb—due to the 2001 and 2002 tax estimates being unduly optimistic…the original 
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TEA21 base spending level of $27.7 billion would have to be lowered by $4.4 billion to 
23.4 billion—a drop of about $9 billion from the prior year.”169  
In the face of this disaster, rather than increasing the gas tax, the House and 
Senate moved bills to restore funding by effectively raiding the trust fund’s surplus 
monies. The long-term effect of this was an eventual depletion of the trust fund and a 
need for continual “bailouts” of the fund with General Treasury Funds, beginning in 
2008. In 2005, Congress again acted in a way that avoided dealing with the gas tax by 
enacting spending levels in SAFETEA-LU (PL 109-59) that would further spend down 
trust fund revenues at an unsustainable rate.170 As of this writing, a total of $140 billion 
has been transferred from General Treasury Funds to the Highway Trust Fund in order 
to meet authorization levels. This figure does not include 3.4 billion transferred from the 
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust fund, nor the $28 billion for HTF and $8 
billion for rail and transit included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (PL 
111-5).171 In 2015, the Congress enacted the first surface transportation reauthorization 
bill in ten years, the FAST Act (PL 114-94).  It adds $281 billion to the Highway Trust 
Fund; $70 billion of that total is from General Treasury Fund transfers from non-
transportation-related revenue sources. Without a highly public event to focus the 
national attention on infrastructure investment, the status quo once again prevailed. 
                                                          
169 Davis, Jeff. “A Decade of Bad Policy.” Transportation Weekly. Volume 13 Issue 15. April 9, 2012: 4. 
170 Davis, Jeff. “A Decade of Bad Policy.” Transportation Weekly. Volume 13 Issue 15. April 9, 2012: 5. 
171 Trombino, Paul. “AASHTO Summary of the New Surface Transportation Bill: Fixing America’s Surface 




Rather than deal with this glaring revenue short-fall, the bill reauthorizes the same 18.4-
cent-per-gallon gas tax that has been in place since 1993.172 
Surely members of Congress would admit that there needs to be additional 
transportation infrastructure investment.173 In order to increase investment, there must 
be a way to increase monies in the Highway Trust Fund. At a reception of transportation 
stakeholders celebrating the passage of the FAST Act in January 2016, House 
Transportation Committee Chairman Bill Shuster (R-PA) stated his intention to hold a 
meeting of stakeholders to work towards a solution to the funding crisis.174 The 
Chairman is in luck, as the Association of American State Highway Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO) has a list of potential alternative funding sources.175 It includes non-
transportation options such as taxes on oil imports along with numerous transportation-
related options in line with the traditional, user-funded system such as a tax based on 
the number of miles a vehicle travels. However, as longtime railroad lobbyist David 
Black, reported in an interview for this thesis, “An open question is whether declining to 
raise the gas tax is due to political fears or because the policy of relying on fuel taxes in 
an era of increasing fuel efficiency and electric vehicles is flawed. Perhaps it’s both and 
that’s why it’s so hard.”176 
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Will Any Crisis Do? 
Kingdon’s theory holds that the Congress is only likely to act in significant ways 
in the face of an obvious, public crisis type of situation—a focusing event. Under this 
regime, the problem with roads is that they degrade slowly. The driver whose daily 
commute steadily becomes longer due to congestion does not suddenly call a news 
conference. The transit rider who increasingly laments to his boss that his “commute is 
killing him” is not literally killed by the delayed subway train. But if he were killed, the 
Congress might pay attention the next day.  
Recently, the General Manager of the Washington, D.C. Metro transit system 
effectively created a focusing event by shutting down the system for a day. This directed 
Congressional attention to the troubled system, which suffers from a lack of capital 
investment, a poor safety culture and decades of mismanagement. Congress responded 
as Kingdon would have predicted, holding an oversight hearing on the DC Metro 
system just a few weeks later. During the hearing, members of both parties—whose 
attentions had not been focused on the local transit system prior to the sudden 
shutdown—expressed exasperation and frustration with the steady decay of the system 
over a period of decades. Indeed, the focusing event manufactured by Metro’s 
leadership may result in a statutory change to how the federal government oversees 
Metro’s safety. During the hearing, several members of the Committee stated they 
would prefer Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) oversight of the transit agency, 
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which is currently regulated by the Federal Transit Administration, since the FRA has 
more experience in rail safety inspections and has the authority to assess civil penalties 
for safety infractions.177 Ironically, Metro’s General Manager testified at the hearing that 
he is going to take a methodical approach to fixing the system rather than “lurching” 
from one crisis to another.178 
Possibly the closest the nation came to a focusing event related to highway 
infrastructure investment was the I-35 bridge collapse in Minnesota in August 2007. In 
that disaster, 13 people were killed and 145 injured when the bridge failed and crashed 
into the Mississippi River. While that tragedy spurred discussion about the need for 
infrastructure investment, apparently it was not a sufficiently terrible accident to 
generate enough support to increase revenue for transportation programs.179  
Does the lack of a Congressional response to this incident disprove Kingdon’s 
theory? No, because the other side of Kingdon’s theory is that for Congress to respond 
to a focusing event, there must be a readily available, acceptable solution to the 
problem.180 The solution presented to the Congress to address this problem was crafted 
by Minnesota Congressman Jim Oberstar (D-MN), then-Chairman of the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. Oberstar released a draft bill in June 
2009—almost two years after the bridge collapse. His bill was the culmination of a forty-
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year career in transportation policy on Capitol Hill. Oberstar released, “an ambitious 
vision for national transportation policy, representing a significant increase in funding 
and a focus on multimodalism.” Although it included additional funding for highways 
and bridges, it also would have created an Office of Intermodalism to implement 
projects of any kind (e.g. non-highway) and $50 billion for high-speed rail.181 None of 
these non-highway policies respond directly to the need to better maintain and repair 
bridges like the one that collapsed. Thus, the solution was rejected as too grandiose and 
not responsive to the obvious problem of the bridge collapse. In fact, within hours of 
Oberstar circulating a legislative draft, “…Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood called 
for an extension of the 2005 highway bill—effectively cutting off long-term [highway 
program] expansion plans.”182 As the Washington, DC politics publication POLITICO 
reported in May 2010, “while the nation’s infrastructure continues to age and crumble, 
Washington is stuck with a neutered transportation chairman, a White House distracted 
by more pressing issues and Congressional leaders who lack the political will to raise 
gas taxes for a new $500 billion measure.”183 
Then as now, everyone involved in transportation is aware of the years-long 
funding problem, but there is no consensus on how to fix it. Indeed, when it comes to 
raising the gas tax, just about every leader in Washington from Speaker Ryan to 
President Obama absolutely opposes the idea. In fact, shortly after former Secretary of 
Transportation Ray LaHood assumed his position in 2008, he floated the idea to a group 
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of reporters that a vehicle-mileage based user fee might be a future option for funding 
transportation programs. The next week he was called to the White House and 
reprimanded for the suggestion. From that point on, he and his successor Anthony Foxx 
have insisted the Congress, not the administration, should identify a funding source.184  
Implications: Will the Next Funding Crisis Be the Focusing Event? 
Under current law, in 2020 there will be a $20 billion annual shortfall in Highway 
Trust Fund revenues. In other words, in order to do another FAST Act type of bill, the 
Congress will have to come up with $100 billion in non-transportation funding sources. 
Will this be the focusing event that is needed? Compounding this funding shortfall, in 
the final year of the bill’s authorization (mid-2019 to mid-2020), there is a $7 billion 
rescission of contract funds in order to reset the baseline funding levels back to 2015 
levels (for political reasons). Perhaps this will be the necessary event that focuses the 
Congress’s attention on the need to come up with a sustainable funding solution? There 
is plenty of time between now and then to select a palatable solution and put it on the 
agenda. For Congress to have to come up with a few billion per year to patch the trust 
fund is one thing, but cutting the program by $7 billion and then having to come up 
with $100 billion is something else entirely. Perhaps this major policy inflection point 
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Kingdon Was Right, What Are the Implications? 
Returning to a discussion on the nature of the Congress and federal system itself, 
as the Federalists papers lay out, the Congress was designed with a bias for stasis. 
House members—and Senators in the modern era—are politically vulnerable and act 
accordingly.  Even though major action on public policy is rare, it can happen if the 
institution’s attention is properly focused. The Federalists built a Legislative Branch with 
so many procedures and checks that quick action responding to the excessive passions 
of a vocal minority faction is unlikely.  
But is wishing that Congress be responsive to the people’s need to travel on well-
maintained, modern highway infrastructure an excessive passion? No, but simply 
complaining or being upset about a bridge collapse is not enough to get the Congress to 
act. As Kingdon points out, and the previous Chapter’s Positive Train Control mandate 
amply demonstrates, a focusing event only leads to major action if there is a readily 
available, acceptable solution. Maybe over the next few years the Congress will actually 
work on identifying that solution so that it is ready to take action when the next focusing 
event occurs—be it a tragedy involving death and destruction or a fiscal nightmare. In 
the next chapter we shall examine ways the Congress might be improved so that it is 
better at identifying and enacting rational policies. Chapter three  explores the notion 
that perhaps by identifying some readily available solutions to make the first branch of 
government function better, the Congress will act on a reasonable recommendation 





How to Improve Congress:  
Options to Enhance the Quality of the Institution Policy Outputs 
 
Why Does Congress Seem to Only Overreact or Do Nothing? 
 The previous two chapters documented examples demonstrating the validity of 
Kingdon’s theory that Congress is most likely to clear a major policy item from its 
agenda in the face of a focusing event. Typically, the urge to take action on a pending 
policy item during the brief window of time when the public’s attention is focused on 
the topic results in the Congress placing greater importance on getting something—
anything—enacted while the crisis is “hot” than the need to enact the most effective, 
well considered policy. Thus, with the assistance of the Kingdon theoretical framework, 
Chapter 1 arrives at an understanding of why Congress enacted the mandate for 
railroads to install PTC systems by a date certain, without a clear understanding of the 
feasibility of the task and the likelihood of future inter-agency coordination problems. 
Likewise, absent a focusing event, the Congress is likely to avoid taking action on 
politically tricky policy matters because of the ever-present feelings of political 
vulnerability among the members. Again with the assistance of the Kingdon model, 
Chapter 2 outlines why Congress has declined to increase federal truck weight limits 
and procrastinated on addressing regular Highway Trust Fund shortfalls.  
 This chapter examines why the institution operates in the manner identified by 
Kingdon. After all, if political realities dictate that some of the most important policy 
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matters the Congress deals with in a given year are enacted while the institution is in 
“crisis mode,” it makes sense to consider any potential reforms to improve and 
strengthen the institution with this in mind. The purpose is to identify potential 
solutions for improving legislative policy performance.   
This chapter examines factors contributing to the haphazard legislative process 
that resulted in the unworkable PTC mandate and the Congress avoiding dealing with 
the gas tax and truck weight limits altogether. It first considers the implications of a 
structural issue that reinforces feelings of political vulnerability among politicians: the 
gerrymandering of congressional districts.  
Next, it documents a critical issue impacting the capacity of the Congress to enact 
legislation to establish well-informed policy for the nation: Congressional staff typically 
have little experience due to a lack of incentives to work for Congress for more than a 
few years.  
Following the staff capacity discussion is an examination of the effects of the 
modern media climate on the Congress at the micro/individual level and 
macro/institutional level. It finds that today’s media climate rewards politicians for 
playing to the extremes of their political bases and often ignores politicians that actually 
enact smart policy.  
The chapter then sheds light on how the activities of professional lobbyists 
impact the quality of policy outputs from the Congress. The Kingdon’s model identifies 
the agenda-setting role of well organized outside interest groups. The PTC, truck weight 
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and gas tax policy examples provide a clear example of the role of lobbyists in policy 
outcomes. The chapter contends that despite negative public perceptions about the 
profession, lobbyists perform an essential and largely unappreciated role in the 
American legislative process.  This section also demonstrates how legislation regulating 
lobbying activities actually sustains and enhances the influence of the most well-
organized and financed interest groups.  
The fifth section of this chapter touches on how the lack of professional and 
social interaction by members of Congress today may contribute to the low levels of 
collaboration among members of different political parties. Kingdon contends the 
political agenda is derived from three elements: the problems identified by the key 
actors, the solutions proposed, and the political will to do something about the 
problem.185 Former members of Congress—including former Senate Majority Trent Lott 
who was interviewed for this thesis—point to personal interaction among legislators as 
a key part of collectively identifying problems and solutions, and building political 
will.186 
The sixth section outlines proposals for who is best positioned to make changes 
to the institution that would allow it to be responsive to the desires of the public, while 
also making good policy. Finally, the paper closes with suggestions for additional areas 
of research related to these subjects—particularly the disruptive effects of the ban on 
Congressionally directed spending (earmarks).  
                                                          
185 Kingdon, John W. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Longman. (1995): 94-95. 
186 Lott, Trent. Former U.S. Senate Majority Leader. Interview with Harrison Wadsworth. Personal 
Interview. Washington, DC. July 11, 2016. 
90 
 
 The methodology employed in this chapter includes a comprehensive review of 
the relevant scholarly literature on the subjects. Information gleaned from this research 
is supplemented by interviews with current and former Congressional staff, members of 
Congress, and professional lobbyists. These first-hand accounts are invaluable for 
developing an understanding of how Congress actually behaves in modern times. The 
chapter’s synthesis of scholarly literature on Congressional activity and interviews with 
practitioners of contemporary Congressional politics contributes to a greater 
understanding of why Kingdon’s theory held true in the transportation policy examples 
outlined in the first two chapters.  
Ideas for improving the functioning of Congress are as numerous as voters at the 
ballot box each November. Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein pushed this 
conversation to the forefront in 2008 with their diagnosis of a litany of problems facing 
the contemporary Congress, including “a loss of institutional identity, an abdication of 
institutional responsibility vis-à-vis the executive, the demise of regular order (in 
committee, on the floor, and in conference), and the consequent deterioration of the 
deliberative process.”187 Their suggestions for strengthening the Legislative Branch 
include revising campaign finance law to level the playing field for challengers, 
reforming the redistricting process, revising the congressional schedule, changes the 
rules for debate, and reforms to earmarks, ethics and political action committees.188 
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Predicting exactly which solution or suggestion is likely to have a significant 
impact is not possible. Despite the well-intentioned and disciplined efforts of several 
generations of scholars, Political Science is not a true hard science. If it were possible to 
devise a formula for success in the effort to improve the Congress, that formula would 
be included in this discussion. Jacob Straus identifies the perils with simply attempting 
to measure Congressional productivity using quantitative criteria such as the number 
Public Laws enacted, landmark legislation enacted, the number of bills introduced, the 
number of days in session, roll call vote figures, committee activities, or even the 
number of days in session. Straus finds each of these measures can be misleading, 
whether taken alone or in tandem with others.189 
The next best option is to explore the various ideas of leading thinkers in this 
field—particularly the practitioners with experience inside and outside of the 
institution—for making the First Branch of government work better. Those ideas are the 
substance of this chapter and they are offered here without excessive consideration of 
the political feasibility of each recommendation.  
Excessive Gerrymandering of Congressional Districts Makes 
Politicians Feel More Vulnerable 
 “The polarization of the parties themselves and the constant campaign has 
become more of an overriding presence in the way the Congress conducts 
business. Oftentimes the political message supersedes the legislative agenda. 
Republican members who used to fear having no accomplishments to point to in 
a general election against a Democrat are now afraid of a right wing primary 
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opponent--especially one with millions of dollars to run ads.”—Former House 
Republican Chief of Staff190 
Elections are an omnipresent reality in modern America. At any given time, there 
may be half a million elective offices either occupied or waiting to be filled. 191 Perhaps 
the most critical factor determining who wins election to a given office is the makeup of 
the constituency. In most cases, state legislative bodies draw the boundaries of federal 
Congressional districts.192  
The political gap between the two major American parties is wider than ever. 
Recent work by Richard Pildes demonstrates that, “We have not seen the intensity of 
political conflict and the radical separation between the two major political parties that 
characterizes our age since the late nineteenth century…the parties have become purer 
and purer distillations of themselves.”193 John Gilmour’s work describes the options 
before politicians in this system as the choice between getting a bill done or maintaining 
the upper hand on a political issue, and identifies the key implication of this political 
gulf. He states that, “When two sets of politicians seek to appeal to distinctly different 
constituencies and offer divergent policy prescriptions…we should expect a stalemate: 
no movement, and perhaps even no bargaining.”194 Pildes concludes that extreme 
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polarization—rather than a temporary aberration—is likely the permanent structure of 
American democracy. Therefore, it is critical to understand this phenomenon in order to 
work through it.195 Although Pildes has come to believe that the pernicious effects of 
gerrymandering are probably exaggerated, and eliminating or diminishing these effects 
is likely overwhelmingly difficult,196 the electoral imperative that permeates every 
decision by successful politicians indicates gerrymandering probably does matter a great 
deal. In any case, there is significant evidence that political polarization has direct 
impacts on legislative outcomes.  
Figure 3 below, compiled by Adam Nordstrom using data in the Library of 
Congress database, illustrates the increasing polarization of the House of 
Representatives, in terms of the number of Republican-sponsored bills cosponsored by 
Democrats, and vice versa. The chart shows the total number of Republican bills 
cosponsored, divided by the total number of bills cosponsored for each Representative, 
from the 97th through 113th Congress (1981-2015). It shows that majority party members 
are much more likely to cosponsor bills authored by members of their own party, and 
much less likely to cross the party line to support a bill authored by the opposition 
party. The widening blank space between the two colors over time represents the 
declining frequency of cross-party support for legislation in recent years. This is 
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indicative of a decreased willingness for Representatives to cooperate with members of 
the other party to advance legislation.197   
Figure 3: The political polarization in the House of 
Representatives has grown over the past two decades. 
 
The 2010 Elections and Subsequent Redistricting 
The Constitution mandates the reapportionment of Congressional seats after 
each decennial census.198 This exercise includes re-drawing the boundaries of 
Congressional districts. After the Republican Party made significant gains in the 2010 
election cycle, they controlled the redistricting process in 17 states (173 House districts), 
while Democrats only controlled the process in 6 states (44 districts). Commissions and 
courts determined the new boundaries in 15 other states, and 7 states did not engage in 
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this process since they only have one at-large House seat. Unsurprisingly, “partisan 
actors – both Democrat and Republican – used redistricting to increase their political 
advantage.”199 The rules of the redistricting process defined the results: more partisan 
districts, where an incumbent’s primary election is his/her only competitive race.200 We 
now know that it also resulted in Republicans holding more “safe” seats, cementing 
their House majority for years to come. The map in Figure 4 below illustrates how few 
competitive House districts remain.  
Figure 4: Map illustrating the competitiveness of House districts. 
Lighter shades are more competitive.201
 Not pictured: Hawaii (dark blue) and Alaska (dark red).  
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Highly Polarized Congressional Districts Eliminate Opportunities for 
Moderate Candidates 
Primaries spread rapidly in American politics from 1903, when they became 
mandatory in the state of Wisconsin. By 1917, 44 states had mandated direct primaries 
for some or all of statewide elections. King concluded “The adoption of direct 
primaries—first for local and state offices, then for congressional nominations and 
finally for the presidency itself—has, of course, been a central factor in the weakening of 
American party organizations, especially since 1968.”202 The adoption of direct primaries 
has played a chief role in weakening party organizations, especially in the second half of 
the 20th century.203 Meanwhile, as discussed in the previous chapters, “the American 
electoral system, especially as it has developed in recent decades, places America’s 
elective politicians in a highly vulnerable position… [more] than are the politicians of 
any other democratic country.” 204 
More House seats turned over in the 2010 midterm elections than any election in 
recent memory. The shift to Republican control in the House was two and a half times 
that of the 1994 election, eliminating Democratic gains in the previous two cycles. The 
111th was the most liberal Congress in the past three decades; the 112th was the most 
conservative. The 2010 elections also had a profound effect on congressional 
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polarization. Not only was the 112th House the most polarized on record; 2010 
surpassed 1994 as the most polarizing election cycle.205 
A guiding principle in politics is he who writes the rules can control the 
outcomes. In 1974, David Mayhew observed a trend of incumbency becoming a source 
of ever-increasing electoral power.206 As he put it, “…the House seat swing is a 
phenomenon of fast declining amplitude and therefore of fast declining significance.”207 
His conclusion more than 40 years ago was that if the trend continues, we will witness 
the continuation of, “the blunting of a blunt instrument…a weakening of the peculiar 
links that party has supplied between electorate and government.”208 The numerous 
Democratic incumbents defeated in the 2012 elections lost because the borders of their 
districts moved, not because incumbency does not have advantages. 
Big wave elections like 2010 eliminate the “marginal” or “moderate” members, 
as they are often called. These are the members with roughly equal party registration 
among their voters. Wave elections are typically strong enough to eliminate all the 
moderate members of one party or another; moderates from both parties will not be 
elected to the Senate at the same time and the House minority party becomes more 
politically polarized. As this effect builds steam over the years, elected officials 
increasingly anticipate the reactions of organized interests and/or politically active 
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citizens; however, there is little reason to believe this governing by anticipation brings 
policies in line with the views of most citizens.209 
 The final result of having little ideological overlap among the voters of 
congressional districts that elect members of opposing parties, the primary winners 
have, “no need or incentive to tack back towards the center—or any other particular 
place—for the general election.”210 As fewer and fewer members today have overlapping 
constituencies, incentives to collaborate are diminished.211 
When Only the Primary Election Matters, Legislating Becomes a Secondary 
Concern 
When a member of Congress is only concerned about the primary election, 
taking extreme positions becomes more politically expedient than actually passing a bill, 
which requires compromising with other members. In that case, “passing policy is 
irrelevant; no one ever got defeated for failing to pass a bill, but they do sometimes lose 
because they are on the wrong side of an issue.”212 Unfortunately, the Congress cannot 
function without cooperation. Chapter one documents how low levels of cooperation on 
reauthorizing rail safety legislation left the Rail Safety Improvement Act sitting in draft 
form for 15 months, then suddenly selected as a solution to the problems exposed by the 
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Chatsworth rail accident, and hastily amended to include the PTC mandate. Chapter 2 
documents how uncooperative behavior by Representatives from the most polarized 
districts has disrupted efforts to modernize the gas tax in recent years.  
While symbolic politics and posturing is as old as the nation itself, it has really 
come into its own in recent years. In the 1980s and 1990s, the various “wars” waged on 
drugs and crime were, “not really designed to reduce drug-taking or criminal activity; 
they seldom do either. They are really designed to impress, by deceiving, the voters.”213 
This is especially problematic in the Senate, which unlike the House is not a majoritarian 
body. “In most cases, the majority governs comfortably in the House. In the Senate, the 
minority has a distinct voice, and the majority often struggles to govern at all.”214 
Although a focusing event can motivate a Senator to remove a hold on a bill,215 a Senator 
is unlikely to find a rationale for removing a hold without the public attention that 
comes with a focusing event.  
In recent years, members of Congress have witnessed a number of shocking 
electoral outcomes that reinforced the rule of prioritizing one’s own electoral imperative 
over the functioning of the institution. In 2014, House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-
VA) lost his primary to local college professor and first time candidate David Brat. In 
2016, U.S. Rep. Renee Elmers (R-NC), an early Tea Party candidate, lost her primary to a 
challenger who attacked her from the right side of the political spectrum. Unable to 
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marshal the votes to keep the House functioning with so many highly polarized 
members in 2015, House Speaker John Boehner suddenly resigned.  
Despite the common wisdom that defeats like Cantor’s are rare, it is not so 
uncommon for House and Senate leaders to lose their elections. In 1994, first-time 
Republican candidate George Nethercutt upset Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA). In 2010, 
long-time incumbent Bob Bennett (R-UT) was defeated by upstart candidate Mike Lee. 
Although not as shocking as the defeat of a member of leadership, Bennett’s Senate 
colleagues certainly took notice of his defeat. And of course in 1972, 29-year-old Joe 
Biden upset 12-year incumbent Senator Caleb Boggs (R-DE).216 Clearly, it is completely 
rational for members of Congress to constantly look to their left or right shoulder in 
preparation for a contested primary. Today’s incumbents are in considerable electoral 
peril. If they’re not, they at least behave as if they are.  
What are the implications of this difficult political operating environment? For 
one thing, retaining a House or Senate seat in the face of constant political exposure is 
expensive—much more expensive than low-exposure politics.217  
The end result of American politicians’ vulnerability, which for House members 
now largely resides in the primary election process due to gerrymandering, “is that it 
makes it even harder for politicians in the United States…to take tough decisions: to 
court unpopularity, to ask for sacrifices, to impose losses, to fly in the face of the 
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conventional wisdom—in short, to take decisions in what they believe to be their 
constituents best interests and in the national interests,” as opposed to their own 
personal electoral imperative.218 Unfortunately, the uncompromising political situation 
in the House of Representatives has permeated the Senate. Many Senators first serve in 
the House, where they develop their brand of national politics while representing highly 
polarized districts.219 
People often assume that in politics and life, some sort of higher-level thinking or 
enlightenment must guide the process when it works well. That could not be farther 
from the truth. Unfortunately, “This reality is offensive to some people who would like 
the intellectual or spiritual to take precedence.”220 But it is just the facts. In the final 
analysis, extremely partisan Congressional districts diminish the citizenry’s 
opportunities to select elected officials. They reduce opportunities for collaboration 
among members of opposing parties. Reduced opportunities for collaboration result in 
less legislation with bipartisan co-sponsorship moving to the chamber floor, ultimately 
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 Insufficient Staff Capacity Contributes to Government-by-Crisis 
 
Loreli Kelly identifies insufficient staff capacity as a leading problem 
contributing to the manic, government-by-crisis process identified by Kingdon. She 
claims:  
The lack of shared expert knowledge capacity in the U.S. Congress has created a 
critical weakness in our democratic process. Along with bipartisan 
cooperation, many contemporary and urgent questions before our legislators 
require nuance, genuine deliberation and expert judgment. Congress, however, 
is missing adequate means for this purpose and depends on outdated and in 
some cases antiquated systems of information referral, sorting, communicating, 
and convening.221 
While scholars like King have focused on the purported downsides of the 
Legislative Branch itself being costly to administer in the above described political 
climate, if anything the Legislative Branch is woefully underfunded. Congress allocates 
itself less than .02% of discretionary federal spending. In real numbers, the Executive 
Branch comprises 180 agencies, 4.1 million civilian and active military employees, and a 
budget of $3.9 trillion per year. The Legislative Branch consists of only a few of agencies, 
has 30,000 employees and uses only $4.5 billion per year. While more resources are 
needed for the execution of laws than writing them, these figures are still far out of 
balance. As a result, the Executive Branch holds much more power in the government, 
even though it is far less democratically accountable.222 
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Congressional Staff Pay and Experience 
Congressional staff work long hours in stressful work environments and earn 
between $30,000 and $50,000 annually. Turnover is high: a recent survey found 63 
percent of staffers in D.C. want to find a new job, with most of them citing a “desire to 
earn more money” as the primary reason. Low- and mid-level staff earn 20 to 30 percent 
less than they would get in the private sector, and senior staff can likely double their pay 
overnight by leaving Congress.223 They must live in the Washington, DC region, where 
the cost of living is third highest among metropolitan areas in the country—seventh 
highest in the world. In June 2016, the average monthly rent for a studio apartment in 
D.C. was $1,574 per month.224 Clearly, there are strong incentives discouraging talented 
people from remaining employed in the House or Senate once they have a basic level of 
experience and competency in their jobs. Kevin Kosar calls for a reality check on the 
need for expert staff to support legislators, writing “It is time to lay to rest the appealing 
notion of the earnest, amateur legislator who can appear at the Capitol three days a 
week and govern with pure horse-sense. The federal government is too huge, complex 
and relentless for that.”225 
Congressional staff matter a great deal to daily and long-term functioning of the 
Congress. As Harrison Fox and Susan Webb Hammond observed more than forty years 
ago, staff expertise (or lack thereof), “…may alter the content of specific legislative 
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products, affect strategic maneuvering, or enhance the constituent-representative link. 
Staff resources are power… [and] influence the larger political spectrum.”226 As our 
economy, society and government has accumulated, it has grown more complex, 
difficult to understand, and tricky to regulate. All the while, the Congressional staff 
“brain drain” persists.  As a result, the average staffer today is generally not very 
experienced and unable to, “maintain an informed understanding of the rules and 
regulations they are in charge of writing and overseeing…”227 Furthermore, despite the 
increase in the scale and complexity of governance, the number of staffers in 
congressional offices has remained nearly the same over the past thirty years.”228 
Certainly, one reason the Congress continues to make poorly informed policy choices is 
its declining staff capacity.229 Figure 5 below illustrates recent reductions in the total 
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Figure 5: House Committee staff size, 1955-2009230 
 
 
This problem is unlikely to be corrected any time soon, as expanding the size of 
Congressional staff is not likely to go over well with voters. As Luntz observed, disdain 
of government employees is almost as high as that of lobbyists. It would be a heavy lift 
to convince people there is a difference between Congressional staff and “unelected 
bureaucrats.”231  With most things in life, the quality of outputs is a function of the 
quality of inputs, and this seems to hold true in American government and politics as 
well. As long as legislative branch appropriations represent a tiny fraction of 
discretionary spending, Americans can expect more low-quality, bungled public policy 
outcomes like the PTC mandate and Highway Trust Fund insolvency. 
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Causes and Effects of the Diminished Power of the Legislative Branch 
 Over the previous several decades, two factors have motivated a decimation of 
Congressional staff and institutional organizational capacity. The first is political optics, 
since “…what better way to show conservative voters back home that you’re serious 
about shrinking government than by cutting your own staff?” The second and more 
important reason has to do with long-term political strategy. The political mantra of 
“starving the beast” in order to reduce the power of the federal government has become 
a practical reality.232 Starting with the Gingrich Revolution in 1995, continuing with the 
Tea Party Movement of 2011, and living on in today’s Freedom Caucus, a segment of the 
conservative political movement aims to defund and dismantle, “…the vast complex of 
agencies and programs that have been created by bipartisan  majorities since the New 
Deal.” The idea is that the people who know these agencies and programs best are the 
most invested in maintaining them. These include professional Congressional staff, 
Congressional Research Service employees at the Library of Congress, and veteran 
committee chairs. None of these professionals will consent to the elimination of 
programs they specialize in overseeing, so those people themselves have steadily been 
eliminated.233 
 Ironically, this effort likely had the opposite effect. Federal spending has 
increased 50 percent since 1995—roughly keeping pace with population and economic 
growth. This growth is partially a consequence of limiting the Congress’ ability to 
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monitor an increasingly complex Executive Branch. For example, federal spending on 
Intelligence operations has roughly doubled since 1997; meanwhile, staffing of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has declined.234 Incredibly, the trend continues. 
House Republican leaders have reduced funding for the Legislative Branch by 20 
percent since 2011.235 As conservatives continue to reduce Legislative Branch resources, 
they lament “judicial activism” and “executive overreach” in the other two branches. 
However, it is the dereliction of the Legislative Branch’s responsibilities that has 
authorized hyperactivity in the other branches.236  
What Can Be Done to Make Congress Stronger? 
Potential remedies to this problem include increasing staff salaries; establishing 
additional standing committees or offices within the Legislative Branch to conduct 
research; and modernizing the Congressional Research Service so that it suits the 
demands of 21st century American society.237 Other suggestions include Congress taking 
back the power of the purse by actually enacting Appropriations bills on a regular basis, 
including the use of earmarks; changing the budgeting process so that an automatic 
continuing resolution takes hold if a budget deadline is missed, in order to avoid 
showdowns that have resulted in recent government shutdowns; increasing 
Congressional oversight of the rulemaking process by mandating legislative review of 
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expensive new rules; and writing clearer statutes that reduce discretionary authorities of 
executive agencies.238  
Today, public approval of the Congress is at record low levels. This section 
identifies some of the causes of its failings, which include mishandling the PTC mandate 
and failing to reliably fund the Highway Trust Fund. The ultimate result is that, 
“Congress struggles to make policy on complex issues while it equally lacks the 
wherewithal to effectively compete on substance in today’s 24 hour news 
cycle…Congress is not so much venal and corrupt as it is incapacitated and obsolete. 
And, in its present state, it cannot serve the needs of American democracy in the 
21st Century.”239 
The Contemporary Media Climate Rewards Showmanship Over 
Substance 
“News outlets have figured out how to monetize anxiety. Viewership is 
benefited more by focusing on doom, failures, scandals, and lack of hope. 
A policy debate requires details, time and effort—the opposite of today’s 
media business model. People getting along and things working out does 
not make money for cable news.”240 –David Black, railroad lobbyist. 
Newsgathering on Bills No Longer Pays the Bills for Media Outlets 
Any discussion about how to improve Congress as an institution must also 
recognize the role of the institutions that translate Congressional activity to a language 
understood by voters: the news media. The business model that once supported and 
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rewarded diligent, time-consuming news-gathering does not compute in today’s media 
climate. The remaining successful media operations increasingly rely on outrage to draw 
an audience. As a result, today’s media climate rewards politicians for playing to the 
extremes of their political bases and often ignores politicians that actually enact smart 
policy. As one former House staffer puts it, “The media is so obsessed with scandal that 
even when the FAST Act was passed in 2015—a monumental achievement of 
Congressional productivity—the news that evening hardly covered it. For months and 
years of work, the public heard almost nothing about Congress actually getting 
something important done.”241  
A contributing factor towards this media orientation is that journalists, in an 
effort to appear unbiased, provide excessive analysis of events, leaving their audience 
uninformed about core facts. Over time, the audience loses interest and confidence in 
journalists as purveyors of information and accepts an “infotainment” style of reporting. 
Thus, in an effort to deliver more than simple descriptions of politicians and their 
positions on issues, today’s journalists and media producers rely excessively on 
interpretation over substance. 242 In the absence of a substantive, policy-oriented forum 
to debate issues, audiences rely upon journalists’ and politicians’ excessive analysis to 
learn about public policy issues.243 
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This problem is only getting worse, as newspapers continue to struggle to find a 
working business model in the digital age. As Shudson and Downie observe, 
“Accountability journalism, particularly local accountability journalism, is especially 
threatened by the economic troubles that have diminished so many newspapers. So 
much of the news that people find, whether on television or radio or the Internet, still 
originates with newspaper reporting.”244 Without vibrant newsrooms at newspaper 
offices across the country, each year less and less hard news is investigated and 
reported. There are still several large city newspapers that maintain a staff of 
investigative reporters, but these reporters are unable to conduct the type of specific fact 
gathering necessary to explain the activities of members of Congress to their 
constituents.  
One Democratic House staffer interviewed for this paper observed, “Members of 
Congress get information from newspapers—a problem in an era of newspapers 
shutting down operations. If your local paper has an expose on an issue, it matters. But 
those are rare.”245 This is concerning, as newspapers continue to shutter their offices and 
the few remaining operations typically reprint one another’s stories. What incentive 
does a member of Congress have to work on difficult policy issues if he will never 
receive credit from the most popular media sources? 
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The Rise of “Outrage Media” 
 One could argue the “outrage media,” – discourse meant to provoke emotional 
responses through the use of sensationalism, ridicule and misleading information246 – 
and Republican Party each have a covert contract with the other as they pursue 
complimentary objectives. Media scholars Berry and Sobjeraj astutely observe that, “The 
outrage media served as a communications link, the central nervous system for an 
insurgency within the Republican Party”247  Just as the outrage media has increased its 
capacity to frame the issues of debate, it has also increased its ability to disrupt 
government institutions and the world economy.248 In 2011, as a direct consequence of 
political brinksmanship stirred up and propelled by outrage industry demagoguery 
surrounding the need to raise the U.S. debt ceiling, the U.S. Treasury’s credit rating was 
downgraded.249 
Some journalism experts are optimistic about the future of their profession. For 
one thing, today’s media environment offers new opportunities for citizen journalists—
and just about anyone to be heard. But we still do not have a way for disciplined, 
professional news gathering organizations to earn enough revenue to sustain their 
operations. In other words, lots of new is great, but a newsroom is essential. Newsrooms 
gather, analyze and investigate. They provide money, logistics and legal services. And 
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its work is generally respected and not ignored. The challenge we must confront is how 
to turn moment of transformation into reconstruction. Unfortunately, the way the 
Congress offers itself to the media compounds many of the problems facing the 
institution.  
The CSPAN Effect: Ideological Showhorses Over Pragmatic Workhorses 
“I sponsored the House resolution to televise Congress. It’s 
bad…eliminating any opportunity for real debate. But this is America, the 
gallery is already open, so Congress had to go on TV.” –Former Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott250 
The first television feed from the floor of the House of Representatives was 
transmitted on March 19, 1979. In 1986, the Senate voted to approve televising their floor 
proceedings as well. Soon thereafter, CSPAN began covering Committee hearings.251 
Literature on the effects of televising Congress is extensive and a comprehensive 
consideration of those writings is beyond the scope of this discussion. But one thing that 
is clear is that televising floor proceedings in the House and Senate transforms the 
legislative process from a semi-private deliberative procedure to a public performance.252  
From the start of the modern, “CSPAN” era of Congress, there was no 
correlation between a member’s actual legislative accomplishments and television 
coverage. Let’s call this the “CSPAN effect.” Tim Cook found that “In the 96th Congress 
[1979-1981], even after the introduction of televised floor proceedings, leadership status 
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and seniority remained crucial through reduced predictors of media visibility, both in 
print and on the air. Yet in some ways, television coverage of the 96th Congress was 
actually kinder to established powers: committee chairs and ranking members were 
reported over and above their length of service.”253 Several years later in 1986, Cook 
discovered that, “leadership and seniority remain central determinants of media 
visibility, either before or after the introduction of televised floor proceedings, even 
though these proceedings [were] presumed to be another centrifugal force dispersing 
power among House members.”254 This is no longer the case.  
Of course, the President remains the only member of the government with a near 
guarantee of obtaining extensive news coverage on any given day. Even as far back as 
the Cook study of the mid-1980s, it was clear that the average member of congress 
struggled to obtain news coverage by simply executing his official duties. Indeed, 
“…with the exceptions of those accused of impropriety, those running for other office, 
and those with more extreme and (usually) more liberal views, few representatives have 
regular, consistent visibility in the media if they are neither senior members nor 
leaders.”255 So what is a back-bench House or Senate member supposed to do to obtain 
free media coverage, if his/her execution of daily duties is insufficient to attract the type 
of coverage that would be carried on the local news back home? The simple solution is 
to gin up controversy, advocate for staunchly partisan positions, or investigate a 
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scandal. In the CSPAN era, non-leadership members have to be over the top to get 
noticed.  
CSPAN also eliminates opportunities for Congressmen of both parties and their 
leadership teams to interact regularly on the chamber floor. Once members were able to 
monitor floor action from their offices rather than in person, “…mediated congressional 
leadership [became] more ideological and less pragmatic.”256 By 1996, Speaker Gingrich 
suspended daily briefings. As Speaker he had control of the House agenda and therefore 
what CSPAN’s cameras would transmit on a daily basis. Gingrich discovered that he 
could get his message out better and without a filter by pushing out briefing documents 
rather than responding to reporter inquiries.257  
The consequence of the CSPAN era is a House and Senate membership that is 
more ideological and less collaborative. Every speech aimed at the cameras in order to 
reach one’s primary electorate by taking hard lines on issues makes collaboration with 
colleagues less likely. Likewise, every day spent monitoring floor activities, without 
being on the floor and participating in the process, is a lost opportunity to meet with 
other members of the body. From a purely sociological perspective, it is much more 
difficult to ignore the appeals for collaboration with members of the other party when 
that member is standing right in front of you. From a political perspective, it is difficult 
for the Speaker to craft an agenda suiting the needs of the members if those members are 
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rarely seen.258 In an earlier era, members who returned to their districts each weekend 
were outliers, mostly from the East Coast, known as the “Tuesday-to-Thursday Club”. It 
was thought they were skirting their legislative responsibilities by leaving Washington. 
Today, just about the entire Congress is a member of that club.259  
Initially, scholars assumed the effects of televising the House would largely be, 
“more of a resource than a hindrance for congressional leadership.” When Cook studied 
the issue in 1986, he noticed, “…television coverage in the 96th Congress was actually 
kinder to established powers: committee chairs and ranking members were reported 
over and above their length of service.” He also found ethical accusations garnered more 
media attention than any other issue. Cook failed to foresee the degree to which 
individual, low-ranking members would find ways to leverage the power of CSPAN’s 
floor coverage and other media elements to constantly challenge Congressional 
leadership.260 In 2015, for example, third-term Representative Daniel Webster (R-FL) 
organized like-minded junior members and led a successful coup against House Speaker 
John Boehner (R-OH) by leveraging the conservative media. Shortly after that, Webster 
led another successful coup against Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy’s (R-CA) 
candidacy for Speaker, in part by raising ethical questions about McCarthy.261 
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Cook was right that junior members could only make the news by taking 
extreme, often more liberal positions. But he did not realize this would come to define 
the political atmosphere of the House in the early 21st century, this time from the 
conservative side.262 
Not all of this can be attributed to CSPAN or the general increase in members of 
Congress appearing on television. CSPAN’s cameras started rolling, “…with the idea of 
increasing transparency; however, at that time most of the legislative process had 
already left the floor…Until the 20th century, Congressmen either did not have staff or 
had very little staff. So they didn’t have an ability to get into the details. Committee 
hearings at that time were actually used to convey information. Today, most legislation 
is staff-driven. The member receives the bill as a nearly finished product.”263  
The CSPAN effect exists in Presidential politics as well, although not directly 
because of CSPAN. As a natural resource issues lobbyist with two decades of experience 
in the White House, Congress and government relations points out, “If the CSPAN effect 
didn’t matter, John Kasich or Jeb Bush would be the Republican nominee right now. 
They were the most qualified, but not as exciting on TV as Donald Trump. The media 
used to go more in-depth into policy questions; now, it’s all about showmanship.”264 
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Furthermore, in the social media era, the CSPAN effect has modulated and 
grown in its impact. As David Black points out, “Social media accelerates the pace of 
reactions to events and their impact. It also makes focusing events interactive: the 
audience itself, comprised of constituents and voters, is a participant.”265 In the Kingdon 
model, this means further compressing the fleeting focusing event legislative window,.  
The Role of the Mass Media in the Legislative Outcomes of Focusing Events  
Clearly, mass media influences how members of Congress execute their official 
duties. 266 In the wake of the Metrolink accident in California—the focusing event that 
spurred Congressional action on the PTC mandate— media outlets displayed horrific 
images of shredded rail cars that in an instant were transformed from comfortable 
conveyances for people going about their daily business to torn and shattered bits of 
steel that killed 26 and maimed 135 innocent passengers. In the wake of the accident, 
mass media outlets played a role in transmitting the horrific images and personal stories 
associated with the tragedy, and repeating claims that a GPS-based PTC system could 
have prevented the accident altogether.  
Two days after the accident, the New York Times ran a story, “Warning System 
Could Prevent Train Crashes,”267 which stated a PTC system could have prevented the 
accident, without any discussion of the feasibility of installing such a system. On the 
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same day, the national outlet ABC News televised a story claiming, “New Technology 
Could Have Averted Los Angeles Train Crash”. The story repeated FRA and NTSB 
claims that, “A coast-to-coast monitoring system that would have prevented last week’s 
train collision that killed 26 commuters in California could be available in five years.”268 
In addition to reporting on how a PTC system could have prevented the accident, media 
outlets reported on the human tragedy of the incident. One New York Times headline 
four days after the accident read, “In Crash, Riders had Destinations and Death in 
Common,” with photos and biographies of the victims.269 There is absolutely no doubt 
that the Chatsworth train collision of September 2008 was horrific. Likewise, there is 
little doubt a functioning PTC system would have prevented it. However, just because a 
PTC system could have prevented it does not mean the technology was readily 
available, as outlined in Chapter 1.  
Regardless, these media stories contributed to the establishment of a consensus 
among the members of Congress that became the leading advocates for the PTC 
mandate. Or as Kingdon would put it, they became policy entrepreneurs who, “…try to 
highlight the indicators that so importantly dramatize their problems… [knowing] that 
focusing events can move subjects higher on the agenda…in the pursuit of their own 
goals, they perform the function for the [political] system of coupling solutions to 
problems, problems to political forces, and political forces to proposals.”270 Sometimes 
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these entrepreneurs are ambitious members of the bureaucracy—like the NTSB official 
who claimed GPS-based PTC was an off-the-shelf technology.271 Other entrepreneurs are 
members of Congress pushed to action when the media raises the saliency of a potential 
solution to an obvious problem. The relationship between the media and political forces 
becomes problematic when the media values sensationalism over substance. In the PTC 
example, news reports implying that dozens of people were killed and injured due to 
the railroad industry’s negligence in deploying a particular safety technology are more 
sensational and compelling than a story without a “bad” actor to point to.  
How to Make the Media Great Again 
Scholars of media and politics have proposed a multitude of ways to encourage 
media outlets to engage in more hard news reporting and investigations. One idea is for 
non-profit institutions to monitor news organizations and critique them for the 
substantive content of their programming. News outlets could be rated on the 
substantive content of their programming, in order to make people aware of the 
problem and improve the quality of content. Along the same lines, newspapers should 
be recognized when they go beyond a single editorial column when endorsing or 
criticizing candidates. Instead, they should publish a series of articles. Although some 
argue that the electorate’s low-information is inconsequential, research indicates people 
are willing to change their minds on an issue when provided with information.272  
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Another suggestion is to simply return to a more partisan press. Attempts to 
avoid bias in news coverage result in non-information and excessive analysis. There are 
some objective facts in policy debates and politics. Pretending otherwise is disingenuous 
and unconstructive. For this reason, several scholars have put forth the argument that 
substantive, issue-oriented coverage could be increased if news organizations were more 
explicit with their bias. We already know that newspapers, for instance, have partisan 
leanings since they endorse candidates273 
Or perhaps candidates should simply leverage the power of the digital age and 
use technology to bypass the news media altogether. The Internet is unfiltered—it lets 
people access information that is meaningful to them, leading to greater political 
involvement. In fact, research suggests direct candidate-voter communication increases 
voter interest and participation. Young people who seek out political information on 
their own tend to become more informed and interested.274  
It is important to be humble in this effort and recognize the limitations of any 
efforts to improve the press. We should not forget that reporters are not really in the fact 
business; they’re in the meaning business. Readers don’t want to know the play-by-play; 
they want to know what it means. People do not care that Hillary Clinton deleted her 
email; they care because a talking head on TV implied her email activity is part of a 
nefarious plot to hide her role in killing the US Ambassador in Lybia.275 Journalism is 
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always going to be about meanings, judgments, interpretations, motives, intentions, 
reasons, explanations and logics.276   
While the digital age provides us more access to information, it does not always 
provide us more access to wisdom. The internet has so much information about every 
possible topic; therefore, it actually stands for nothing, which is the opposite of politics. 
It also makes it easier for statements made in jest to be taken literally and has a tendency 
to give credence to the most extraordinary statements, rather than the most accurate. 
The bottom line is it makes it harder to filter information from noise.277  
Lobbying Activity and the Unintended Consequences of 
Regulating Rights Guaranteed by the First Amendment 
“The Bill of Rights explicitly protects four professions: Journalists (1st 
Amendment), Clergy (1st Amendment), Criminal Defense Attorneys (6th 
Amendment), and Lobbyists (1st Amendment.)”278 –Adam Nordstrom, lawyer 
and railroad lobbyist.  
Lobbying: An Honorable Profession 
There is a fundamental misunderstanding about lobbying among the American 
public. Even though it was only formally defined as an occupation in 1946, lobbying is 
probably one of the world’s oldest professions. Lee Drutman defines lobbying as, 
“…any activity oriented towards shaping public policy outcomes.”279 Lobbying was first 
                                                          
276 Ridout, Travis N. New directions in media and politics. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
(2013): 210-220. 
277 Ridout, Travis N. New directions in media and politics. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
(2013): 218. 
278 Nordstrom, Adam, Railroad Lobbyist and Lawyer. Interview with Harrison Wadsworth. Personal 
Interview. Washington, DC. June 15, 2016 
279 Drutman, Lee. The business of America is lobbying : how corporations became politicized and politics became more 
corporate. Oxford New York, NY: Oxford University Press. (2015): 15. 
122 
 
regulated under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946. It is unsurprising that 
subsequent attempts to amend the law, “…largely stalled in the face of persistent 
concerns about First Amendment encroachments.”280 After all, the right to petition the 
government is explicitly guaranteed. The 1946 statute was repealed and replaced in the 
early days of the Gingrich Speakership. The system put in place under the 1995 
Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) is largely still in place today. Under the LDA, “a 
‘lobbyist’ who is required to register with Congress is defined as ‘any individual who is 
employed or retained by a client for financial or other compensation for services that 
include more than one lobbying contact, other than an individual whose lobbying 
activities constitute less than twenty percent of the time engaged in the services 
provided by such an individual to that client over a three-month period.’”281 
Lobbyists in Washington perform tasks essential to good governance. As Allard 
explains, “For the most part, public policy advocacy is necessary, difficult work 
performed by law-abiding, highly skilled professionals who help government arrive at 
better-informed, and hopefully better, decisions.”282 As Kingdon and Drutman make 
clear, lobbyists play an important role in influencing the legislative agenda.283 
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Organized interests in Washington represent a wide range of important aspects 
of the American economy and culture. Whatever one’s special interest, there is most 
likely an organized lobby outfit supporting it. But not all interests are influential. 
Despite Madison’s eloquent prediction in Federalist 10 that the combination of the 
nation’s interest groups will result in policy that suits the need of the broader 
population, there is evidence to the contrary. Taken together, all of the mass-based 
interest groups and businesses active in politics do not represent the interests of the 
citizenry as a whole. In fact, business-oriented groups have a negative overall correlation 
with the policy preferences of most citizens.284 Madison was right about something else, 
though. His belief that ‘the causes of faction’ are ‘sown in the nature of man,’ removable 
only by ‘destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence’”285 rings true in 
Washington today.  
Even though the interests of business do not always line up with the interests of 
other Americans, there is still an intense competition among those involved in public 
policy advocacy to have their position carry the day. No amount of relationship-
building, campaign contributions, or access can overcome being on the wrong side of an 
issue. In Washington there exists a self-correcting mechanism in the policy process: the 
contest to be right. No one has a monopoly over information and, “As Hubert 
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Humphrey said, ‘the right to be heard does not automatically include the right to be 
taken seriously.’”286 
It stands to reason that as more people engage in lobbying activity, the influence 
of any single advocate is diminished. Therefore, today’s intense lobbying activity in 
Washington is a positive development.  Before the 1970s, few corporations retained 
lobbyists and business trade associations engaged in nothing close to the scope and 
sophistication of modern lobbying.”287  
Even though large-scale studies of the impact of money spent on lobbying 
activity fail to uncover any specific impact of money on outcomes. It is likely this is 
because the bias for the preferences of organized interests permeates the Capitol, from 
what makes it on the agenda to whom officials meet and ask for campaign money, and 
how those officials vote.288 Money does not buy outcomes, it buys access. Lobbyists’ 
strongest impact is on the agenda-setting stage of the process. They help officials 
determine which issue to work on and which can be ignored without consequence.289 
The Myth of the Unified “Public Interest” 
One of the most frustrating aspects of studying Congress and questions about its 
responsiveness to public opinion is the assumption that the “public” is some sort of 
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unified entity with a set of policy preferences. The simple truth is some people have 
more of an interest in some things than others.  
Should “elites” who know the most about policy questions have 
disproportionate influence the debate? Although Gilens and Page believe, “organized 
citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their 
expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect,”290 this is a much too charitable view 
of the average citizen. When it comes to questions of a scientific or technical nature, for 
example, it certainly seems like elites should have the loudest voice. Consider the 
Climate Change debate for example.  
Extreme climate change skeptics are routinely lampooned for their ignorance, 
and are encouraged to stay out of the debate unless they are willing to agree to rational 
terms, like using an observable, falsifiable, repeatable scientific method to back claims. 
After all, why should a politician who admittedly knows nothing of climate science 
ignore the wisdom of the experts? The same is true of other policy questions, such as the 
specifics of government safety regulations or business practices regulations. Should the 
voice of the “average citizen” who knows little of highway safety be heard as loudly as 
the civil engineer? Should the average citizen who has never seen a railroad operation 
determine how frequently a locomotive must be inspected? Any rational person would 
have to agree not. Whether or not all relevant voices are considered should be the test for 
whether or not a policy decision is made justly—not whether or not everyone was heard. 
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The average citizen benefits from a rationale climate change policy, speed limits and 
industrial regulations, even if the average person either disagrees with or does not 
recognize the wisdom of elite input.  
Although Madison is mistaken in his assumption that the end result of debate 
among elite factions would be policies consistent with public sentiment, it is not 
necessarily a bad thing that the preferences of elites are often chosen over the average 
person. Even though elites and business groups often successfully push for public 
policies contrary to the wishes of the average citizen, the hard truth is when it comes to 
many public policy questions, elites know better. They are called “elite” for a reason.  
However, the extent to which large portions of the public assume lobbyists are behaving 
illegally or immorally damages the Congress’ reputation. It also misdirects the public’s 
attention in terms of what actually drives opportunities for some actors to have a 
disproportionate influence over policy.  
Lobbyists Influence is Significant, but Typically Overstated 
Scholars have been unable to consistently find that interest group lobbying 
dollars translate into policy influence. In the most large-scale project to date, 
Baumgartner et al. (2009) followed hundreds of policy issues and compare resources 
dedicated to each side of each issue, only to find that aggregate resources do not 
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determine who wins.291 In short, researchers have failed to find a direct relationship 
between money spent and policy outcomes for lack of trying.292 
Despite lacking hard evidence of the particular influence of lobbying activity 
affecting specific official actions by members of Congress, journalists continue to operate 
under the assumption that politicians can be bought like a car.293 Indeed, “for the most 
part, journalists have either assumed or asserted (on the basis of highly flawed evidence) 
that interest group lobbying, whether direct or indirect, inside or outside, old-breed or 
new-breed, can have substantial influence on how members of Congress vote.”294 This 
trope continues to permeate journalists and their audience.  
More likely, the lobbyists of well organized interests are most influential in terms 
of agenda setting. Their power lies in the extent to which they are able to establish a 
universe of acceptable policy issues. Leading interest groups have had the opportunity 
to contribute to agenda setting in informal and formal ways for decades. For instance, in 
the 104th Congress, then-Republican Conference Chairman John Boehner (R-OH) held 
weekly strategy sessions with the leaders of major interest groups. He did this both to 
learn from them what should be on the congressional agenda, and to call upon the 
lobbying teams of those interests to help him persuade his members to support his own 
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agenda.295 Today, agenda setting by the well organized interests is even more expensive, 
technical and advanced, mirroring the global economy in general. Corporations and 
trade associations go beyond investing in lobbying; they fund think-tank white papers 
and draft op-eds; they hold panel discussions and other public events to shape the 
intellectual and policy environment. This allows them, “…to make sure certain frames 
and assumptions come to mind immediately and easily when policymakers consider 
legislation and rules.” As Drutman puts it, modern lobbying efforts “come with 
footnotes.”296 
The influence of financial contributions from lobbyists is vastly overstated. There 
is significant evidence to suggest, “Individuals are the main source of money in U.S. 
campaigns, and their presence mutes the political leverage of interest groups…In a way, 
then, 20 million individuals in the United States protect themselves and their fellow 
citizens from special interest power with their donations of about $100 dollars each.”297 
Perhaps if individuals quit contributing to campaigns, interest group money would be 
more pivotal for elections and policymaking. At the same time, when it comes to 
discrete policy questions that are of little interest to people outside of a particular field 
or business, the access afforded to interest groups via their campaign contributions can 
be significant. Campaign contributions and money to hire lobbyists buys access, not 
outcomes. Legislators and their staffers are busy people. Campaign contributions are 
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one way to improve the chances of getting to see the legislator about matters of concern 
to the group.”298 
Just because we do not have explicit evidence for a direct connection between 
most lobbying activity and most outcomes does not mean a strong association does not 
exist. Politics is a fluid environment that is difficult to model. Objectively, “Social science 
research on political influence has found no relationship between political resources and 
likelihood of success. However, the lack of a direct, statistically significant correlation 
does not mean there is no influence. It just means that the influence is 
unpredictable…Policy does not go to the highest bidder. Politics is far messier, and fare 
more interesting than such a simplistic model might suggest.”299 
Lobbyists Subsidize the Legislative Process 
“Of course lobbyists subsidize the policy process with their data and policy 
research. You have to assume that if you don’t, your opponent will.”300  
--David Black, railroad lobbyist. 
To the extent the Congress still moves legislation outside the shadow of a crisis, 
“Lobbyists more than subsidize the legislative process; they drive it.”301 Lobbyists are 
experts in their field and by definition represent much more than their own self-interest.  
Their primary role is to be a trusted source of information, “…and it is axiomatic that 
legislators benefit when they can consider information from a broad range of interested 
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parties…”302 As outlined in the next section, the Congress in recent years has reduced its 
institutional capacity for policy development, even as the economy and population has 
grown tremendously. As a result, Congress relies on lobbyists for information. 
Consequently, in its interactions with professional and amateur lobbyists alike, it is not 
so much that Congress is, “venal and corrupt as it is incapacitated and obsolete,” unable 
to serve the needs of democracy in the 21st Century.303 It is no surprise that two-thirds of 
staffers recognize the need for lobbyists in Washington.304  
Lobbying is Effective 
In 2014, Gilens and Page published findings that go beyond the policy influence 
of a single organized interest. While their method is imperfect, they found, “…economic 
elites and organized interest groups representing business interests have substantial 
independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens and mass-based 
interest groups have little or no independent influence.”305 The truck weight policy 
example in Chapter 2 is an example of an organized group of business interests (the 
railroads) leveraging the support of average citizens (highway motorists) to achieve a 
desired outcome (maintaining current weight limits). 
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To be sure, is a two-way street. The elected officials ask for money. A number of 
scholars have even made the argument that, “…campaign contributions from interest 
groups may not represent quid pro quo bribery attempts by groups, but instead result 
from extortion by politicians who threaten to harm the groups’ interests.”306 Still, 
politicians are apt to criticize lobbyists, as Senators Rockefeller and Boxer did in the 
railroad policy example in Chapter 1.307 
Efforts to Regulate Lobbying Have Aided Well Organized Interest Groups and 
Marginalized Minor Players 
“The anti-lobbyist mentality is a result of political and media consultants 
profiting off of anti-establishment backlash. The truth is everyone has a special 
interest.”308 –Natural Resource Issues Lobbyist and former White House and 
Congressional Staffer 
In 2007, the Congress passed the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 
of 2007 (HLOGA; PL 110-81; see Figure 6 below), amending portions of the Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995. Upon passage, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) released the 
following statement:  
The bill…ends the tight-knit relationship between lobbyists and lawmakers. We 
told the American people that Democrats would ‘drain the swamp’ and change 
the way business is done in Washington…we restored accountability by 
imposing the toughest ethics standards ever: no gifts, no private jets, and no 
meals from lobbyists….The Honest Leadership, Open Government Act of 2007 
and the Congressional ethics reforms enacted in the first 100 hours of this 
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Congress are significant steps forward in cleaning up the culture of corruption 
that has plagued Washington, D.C.  On the first day of this new Congress, the 
House passed rules to ban gifts and travel from lobbyists to Members of 
Congress, and end the abuses connected to privately-funded congressional 
travel.309 
Figure 6: Relevant Provisions of Honest Leadership and Open Government 
Act310 
Section Provision Summary 
Title 1 Closing Revolving Door and 
Ending “K Street Project” 
Increases “cooling off period” before 
senior officials and staff can lobby 
Congress. Prohibits officials from 
influencing employment decisions solely 
on the basis of partisan affiliation. 
Title II Full Public Disclosure of 
Lobbying 
Increases frequency of lobbyist disclosure 
reports from semi-annual to quarterly. 
Requires lobbyists to certify they have not 
given gifts or travel in violation of rules. 
Sets disclosure trigger for reporting 
lobbying at $5,000 annually. 
Title III House Rule Changes Prohibits House members from 
negotiating future lobbying contracts 
while in office and mandates disclosure of 
any similar negotiations by senior staff.  
Title V Earmark Reform and Gift 
Ban 
Requires Appropriations Committee to 
list members who requested specific 
directed spending provisions. Prohibits 
Members and staff from accepting gifts 
from lobbyists. 
 
Contrary to the rhetoric, “Greater regulation [of lobbying] has actually coincided 
with a sharp increase in professional lobbying, alongside an increase in related work by 
professionals with government-relations expertise representing clients facing oversight 
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and public investigations.”311 Part of this is simply because success begets interest in 
lobbying. “…corporate lobbying is self-reinforcing: once companies establish 
government relations departments, those departments find ways to justify their 
continued and often expanding existence, and corporate managers come to see politics 
as important, finding more and more reasons to stay involved and taking advantage of 
the decreased marginal costs of political activity once initial start-up costs are paid.”312 
Moreover, as companies become more experienced and comfortable navigating 
the legislative and regulatory process, they increasingly become adept at working for 
their own narrow interest. Drutman describes this phenomenon succinctly: “As 
corporate lobbying investments have expanded, they have become more particularistic 
and more proactive. They have also become more pervasive, driven by the growing 
competitiveness of the process to become more aggressive.”313 The ultimate effect of the 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act was to concentrate the power of the 
largest companies and limit the influence of smaller players. The smaller and less well 
financed interests that still wanted to be “in the kitchen” in Washington felt compelled 
to establish PACs in order to obtain access,” since they could no longer rely on paying 
for informal lunches or other ways of accessing decision-makers.314 
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For example, in 2003 if a lobbyist wanted to have lunch with a member of 
Congress, he could spend $100 for a meal at a fine downtown restaurant and have an 
hour to present his views to the member. Today, that activity would be illegal. In the 
words of Speaker Pelosi buying food cannot be allowed because the Congress voted to, 
“...break the link between lobbyists and legislators.”315  
In 2003, the lobbyist could spend an hour with the elected official who will be 
making decisions that greatly affect the success or failure of his business. During the 
meal, he could share his company’s viewpoint and hope to influence the member’s 
decision. The next day, the Congressman will probably want to each lunch again. This 
day, he dines with a lobbyist from a competing firm with a different opinion on the 
proposed legislation. That lobbyist hopes to influence the Congressman. On Thursday, 
the Congressman votes in favor of the second company. The lobbyist then hosts a 
reception in his honor during the company’s next Board of Directors meeting. All of that 
free food is now outlawed.  
Today, it would play out like this. Lobbyists cannot buy a $50 meal for a 
Congressman; however, it is perfectly legal and often that lobbyists will have lunch with 
members of Congress. The only difference is now they must bring a check for $500 to 
$5,000 made out to the member’s campaign or leadership committee with them. As 
previously discussed, “Campaign contributions may not ‘buy’ votes in any crude sense; 
a good deal of evidence suggests that they do not. But the need for them is bound to 
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color deeply a congressman’s or senator’s image of his entire political environment.”316 
Certainly a large check to a Congressman’s campaign, in an era of political upsets and 
regular primary challenges, must be more influential than a single meal.  
If there is a problem with the way lobbying is conducted in Washington today, it 
is that one set of interests routinely overpowers the rest. It is much harder for a small 
interest to muster the resources to establish and fund a Political Action Committee, or 
for a lobbyist they hire to write personal checks. Efforts to regulate lobbying—an activity 
clearly protected by the First Amendment—have reinforced this state of play. This is not 
to suggest there is a way or reason to prevent powerful groups from exercising their 
power. As one former staffer put it, “There are always going to be economies of scale, 
whether you’re Walmart in the economy or Walmart in politics.”317  
Another unintended consequence of today’s regime of lobbying regulation is that 
it, “reinforce[s] the view that politicians and lobbyists are corrupt, and unless you 
micromanage every aspect of their behavior they will do the wrong thing."318 HLOGA 
reinforces this misguided public perception of who lobbyists are and what they do. As 
one House Democratic staffer stated, “There is a public perception that all lobbyists are 
corrupt. People don’t realize that most lobbyists interest that are important for everyday 
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life.”319 A former Republican staffer expressed the same sentiment, arguing, “HOLGA 
gives lobbyists a bad name. There is an undeserved, negative mystique surrounding the 
profession. It’s incredible that President Obama banned the most knowledgeable people 
in town from working for his Administration.”320 The same staffer observed that the title 
“lobbyist” is largely meaningless anyway, since, “Thousands of people lobby every year 
without considering themselves lobbyists…plenty of people come here to lobby without 
ever triggering registration requirements.”321 
The problem with these public perceptions is that the Congress has made efforts 
over the years to be responsive to them as if they were accurate. Often, Congressmen 
have actually inflamed these misguided passions. As Allard points out, “The public is 
extremely suspicious of lobbyists; approximately eighty percent of Americans believe 
that lobbyists exercise undue influence on public policy.”322 Perhaps the conduct of some 
lobbyists has convinced the public that most lobbyists are corrupt.323 If that is the case, it 
will be extremely difficult to disabuse the public of this flawed understanding.   
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President Obama’s Prohibition Against Lobbyists Serving in his 
Administration was a Tremendous Mistake 
“You are a statesman when you do what you think is best even when your 
constituents think otherwise, and they later come to agree with you.” 
—Former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott324 
Despite the imperfect system that exists for regulating lobbying activity, one 
thing that is a simple fact of life in this system is that the lobbyists themselves are some 
of the most politically skilled people in the nation. For this reason, President Obama’s 
Executive Order 13490 of January 21, 2009—his first day in office—prohibiting 
registered lobbyists from working in his administration was a tactical error with 
longstanding consequences. The action may have sent a politically expedient signal to 
the nation, but its practical impact was that many of the people who had registered as 
lobbyists over the past several years, “…(including some who had done so just to be 
careful, even though they probably didn’t have to) were disqualified from 
administrative positions they had hoped to obtain.”325  
The effect was to prevent thousands of people with advanced policy expertise 
from serving their nation in administrative positions. Many of these people were former 
House and Senate staffers that could have leveraged personal and professional 
relationships to advance the President’s agenda, as was the practice under previous 
administrations.326 Former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) points out that his 
former colleague and current business partner, Former Senator John Breaux (D-LA) was 
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probably more qualified than anyone else in the nation to provide advice to the Obama 
Administration as it developed its healthcare proposals in 2009, given his decades of 
public service in healthcare policy as a member of the House and Senate. In fact, Obama 
invited him to the White House for a healthcare summit in 2009, but later revoked the 
invitation after learning he had registered as a lobbyist after leaving the Senate.327  
The Executive Order also had the unintended result of discouraging many 
political and government professionals from engaging in activities that would trigger a 
lobbying registration. Perhaps Senator Breaux would have avoided activities that trigger 
registration if he knew he would be shut out of future policymaking processes. 
Suddenly, after the Executive Order, a new class of “consultants” and “strategic 
advisors” emerged: people who advised lobbyists without actually having any contact 
with officials covered under the lobbying laws.328 
As one former White House staffer turned lobbyists put it:  
That Executive Order was the biggest systematic mistake President Obama could 
have made. It means anyone who can get things done isn’t working for him. The 
only way to learn the legislative and regulatory process is to do it; no bill passes 
the same way twice. The result is the only real practitioners in the 
Administration are the ones of high enough personal wealth and status that they 
never have had to register to lobby, and are able to take a pay cut to work in the 
Administration. It also discourages people from following the lobbying rules.329 
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The Corruption Discussion is a Distraction 
“It’s offensive to imply a nice meal is going to sway a person’s thinking or belief. 
You’re not going to get money out of the system; you’ll just redirect it. The access 
points have changed: PAC checks instead of steaks and bar tabs.”  
—Former House Republican Chief of Staff330 
Simple corruption is not a problem in Washington. However, it is a problem that 
the common wisdom of how Washington operates comes with an assumption that 
“special interests” and their lobbyists “buy” politicians, sort of like you’d buy a candy 
bar or a bag of chips out of a (very high-dollar) vending machine.331 Former Senator Lott 
bluntly describes this view as, “Purely offensive. I voted against HLOGA for a number 
of reasons, but mainly because it implies that I or any other Senator could be bought off 
by a meal.”332 
The problem with this view is not only that is it wrong, but also that it misdirects 
the discussion. In short, it asks us to analyze politics without the actual politics–without 
the competition between competing interests, without the shifting alliances and 
coalitions, without parties and ideology, without any sense of there being a 
policy process, and without the many unpredictabilities and uncertainties that actually 
make politics interesting. It asks us to analyze transactions between individual 
politicians and individual special interests, as if they were separate and independent 
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events (they are neither) that can be described as either “corrupt” or “not corrupt” (a 
useless dichotomy). 
In so doing, we miss the bigger and more important story. The real story is not 
that lobbying or special interests are inherently bad. We have had them as long as we’ve 
had politics. And in assuming corruption is the problem, the solutions offered to fix it do 
not correspond with the purported goals of bringing more people to the table. Bringing 
more people to the table would be better accomplished by addressing issues of 
information asymmetry, the balance of power among competing interests, and the 
excessive particularism of well established interest groups.333  
If getting a preferred legislative outcome were as simple as writing a campaign 
check or in past years buying steaks and martinis, everyone would do it. The reason to 
hire so many lobbyists is that genuine political influence is actually hard work. It 
requires building a compelling case and then making that case over and over and over 
again. It means being in multiple places at once. Most of the time in Washington, not 
much is happening at the measurable surface, so having someone monitor the state of 
play and build relationships over the long-run is critical.  
Suggestions for Correcting the Record and Widening the Lobbying Tent 
Public concerns about the influence of lobbying can best be addressed with more 
lobbying, not less. When more individuals and interests are active in Washington, the 
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influence of each interest is dispersed. This is what Madison was after—more factions 
lead to more representation. The problem with the so-called reforms of HLOGA is that 
they create barriers to entry into lobbying activity.  
Baumgartner et. al.—who concluded that organized interests’ most powerful 
impact is agenda setting—found, “…the only reforms that are likely to have very 
powerful effects would be those that change the distribution of who is at the table, or 
reduce the degree of distortion that is currently in the system.” Distortion refers to the 
complete lack of voice for those who are not politically engaged and the extreme 
amplification of the voices of organized groups.334 Under our Constitution, Baumgartner 
is probably best pursuing his first suggestion: changing who is at the table. The best way 
to accomplish that is not by limiting who gets access by further regulating lobbying 
activity (i.e. the First Amendment). Instead, the focus should be on getting a larger table 
with more chairs. As the adage goes, if you’re at the table or in the kitchen, you’re 
probably not on the menu.  
Naiveté and a simplistic outlook will not help address this challenge. Although 
the American Constitutional system aims to represent the People, frankly there is not 
now, nor will there ever be perfect representation of any group or interest in America. It 
will always be as Churchill once said, “No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-
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wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except for 
all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”335 
Declining Frequencies of Interaction Among Members of Congress 
Hurts the Legislative Process  
A reduction of professional and social interaction by members of Congress 
today—and a resulting decline in camaraderie among them—might contribute to the 
low levels of collaboration among members of different political parties. Hard research 
on this subject is limited, but the remarks of current and former members of Congress 
make it worthy of mention. 
As touched on in the above discussion of the CSPAN effect, in today’s Congress 
there are fewer opportunities than ever before for members to interact and collaborate 
with one another. From the growth of the now nearly universal “Tuesday-to-Thursday 
Club,”336 to the difficulty of leading several hundred ambitious politicians with little 
personal interaction, 337 there is reason to believe that limited interaction among 
members of Congress might have an impact on the outputs of the institution.  
Recently, former Senate Majority Leaders Tom Daschle (D-SD) and Trent Lott (R-
MS) have raised this issue in a book they co-authored. Combined, they have nearly sixty 
years of experience in the Congress and according to their experience, they “…know 
that communication within and between the parties—and the relationships that result—
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creates chemistry, an absolute necessity to the functioning of good government.” They 
add that, “chemistry, compromise, leadership, courage and vision” are lacking in 
today’s Congress. The two leaders—who led their parties in the Senate when the 
partisan division of the body was 50-50 in 2001—observe that the institution has, 
“reached a point of gridlock that’s got us at a crisis point.”338 
As leaders of their respective Senate caucuses, the two kept a constant line of 
direct communication (literally a phone line), to bypass the scandal-obsessed media and 
partisan bean counters on their staffs. 339 They write that, “the ubiquity of planes and 
telecommunication has made it feasible to work in Washington without living there (in 
fact, being a Washington resident is used against candidates.) True to its name, the media 
has become a comfortable filter through which both sides can hurl partisan assaults 
without having to face each other. Meanwhile, primaries have begun to reward the 
extremes, stripping away moderates on both sides of the aisle and turning off voters in 
the process…”340 
Lott observed that when he served in the House, he lived with his family in 
Annandale, VA, a suburb of Washington, DC. Six other members of Congress lived in 
his neighborhood and all of their children “…played kick the can and baseball together 
and our spouses socialized. You can’t exactly go up to the microphone on the floor and 
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destroy the character of your neighbor and father of kid’s little league teammate.” As 
Majority Leader, he made a point of scheduling votes on Monday at noon and Friday at 
noon, so that members would have to be in Washington working, rather than dashing 
off to the airport on Thursday morning and only returning to vote on Tuesday evening.  
He recently advised a group of current House members to move their families to 
Washington and for Speaker Ryan to schedule votes as he did, telling them, “The job 
really is not worth it if you spend every moment trying to leave it. Have a little courage 
and be here, taking the tough votes. If you lose your election, you can go do something 
else having at least made an effort here.” He admits it is unlikely they will take his 
advice.341 
While their experience likely informs a valuable opinion, it is extremely difficult 
to determine the degree to which social interaction contributes to political functionality. 
Fortunately, there is one recent example of an effort to leverage personal interaction 
among politicians and the resulting relationships that inevitably form to promote a 
constructive dialog that yields tangible results. In preparation for developing a passable 
surface transportation reauthorization, House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee Chairman Bill Shuster (R-PA) established a “Panel on 21st Century Freight 
Transportation.” Committee members from both parties were included on the panel, 
which conducted field visits of freight-related facilities throughout the country. Shuster 
hoped that visiting actual facilities that would benefit from transportation legislation—
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while spending time traveling and touring with colleagues—would encourage 
collaboration on his future bill. Whether or not the panel directly contributed to 
Shuster’s success in getting what became the FAST Act passed is difficult to prove. As 
one former staffer bluntly put it, “Congressmen always being at home means they’re not 
legislating.”342 Perhaps getting on the road together, conversing over long bus and train 
rides, researching the transportation needs of America opened new avenues for political 
collaboration that contributed to legislative success.  
Personal Interactions Strengthen Relationships and Establish Necessary Levels 
of Trust 
As the Lott-Daschle phone line demonstrates, there is value in being able to keep 
private negotiations private should not be underestimated. “Staying private” may be a 
more effective strategy for actually achieving policy objectives. For example, although 
there was some public debate, the big items in the Gingrich/Clinton budget agreement of 
1997 were worked out privately between the two sides. Staying private eliminates 
opportunities to antagonize the other side and paint oneself into a corner with 
rhetoric.343  
Consider Reagan Communications Director Pat Buchanan’s Washington Post op-
ed in which he declared that a vote on intervention on behalf of the Nicaraguan contras 
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was a test of whether the Democrats stood for freedom or communism.344 Or more 
recently when President Bush famously declared in a joint session to Congress in 
September 2001 that, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush 
Archive). Reagan lost the vote and although Bush won support for his authorization of 
force in Afghanistan, the line is remembered as producing to the first fissures of public 
sentiment in a nation united after the 9/11 attacks.  
However, more political outcomes since then call into question the theory that 
staying private is a significantly more effective strategy. For instance, in the summer of 
2011, President Obama and House Speaker John Boehner reportedly had identified a 
“grand bargain” to sort out ongoing disagreements between the parties over federal 
discretionary spending and entitlement reforms. However, according to the Democrat’s 
version of events, “while the president stood resolute against pressure from his own 
party, Boehner crumpled when challenged by the more radical members in his caucus.” 
And according to the Republicans’ version of events, “Obama, reacting to pressure from 
Democrats in Congress, panicked at the last minute and suddenly demanded that 
Republicans accede to hundreds of billions of dollars in additional tax revenue. A 
frustrated Boehner no longer believed he could trust the president’s word, and he 
walked away.”345  
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More likely, both caucuses more or less immediately rejected the deal, largely on 
the grounds that they did not have input. After all, people do not enter public office to 
be told what to do on major issues. And in the Congress, they typically will not agree to 
anything unless they at least have an opportunity to insert a particular personal priority 
into any final deal. Furthermore, in a political system in which House districts are 
gerrymandered to the point that there is little overlap between the prevailing political 
disposition of the voting public in the vast majority of Republican and Democrat 
districts, opportunities for compromise are practically non-existent, no matter if the deal 
is accomplished through a public campaign or private negotiation.  
Drutman identifies the fallacy of assuming transparency is the ultimate solution 
for problems in Washington. He responded to an interview question about the role of 
transparency the conclusion that, “People assume if a deal is cut transparently, in public, 
the deal will be cut in the ‘public interest.’ But politics is actually about the reconciliation 
of divergent interests. There is this expectation that when you open up the political 
process, the ‘people’ will be represented… [ignoring the fact that] an issue wouldn’t be 
up for public debate in the first place if everyone was already in agreement.”346 In other 
words, if there is going to be a deal, some people will lose.  
Recently, private negotiations resulted in a significant political agreement: the 
multi-lateral Iran nuclear deal. Israeli efforts to scuttle the deal by making elements of 
the alleged discussions public indicates their belief in the power of “going public” to 
                                                          




make political compromise more difficult. Indeed, “the more the president can avoid the 
political echo chamber associated with partisan battles, the better the chance the 
president has to lead public opinion.”347 
Who Should Lead Institutional Change? 
“The biggest reason the gas tax is not on the agenda is a lack of Presidential 
leadership: Obama took it off the table. If he won’t lead, how can you expect 
Congress to walk that plank?”—Former G.W. Bush White House Staffer, House 
Republican Staffer, and Current Transportation Lobbyist348 
This chapter identifies a number of potential changes that could strengthen the 
Congress. The second chapter outlines the many obstacles that stand in the way of 
Congressional activity and the first describes what it takes for legislators or other leaders 
to become policy entrepreneurs that actually utilize personal political capital to enact a 
preferred policy solution in legislation. But who is best positioned to make changes to 
the institution that would allow it to be responsive to the desires of the public while also 
making good policy? 
The President 
Presidents have the unique ability to appeal directly to the American public for 
support of a policy agenda. In fact, such appeals have been increasing for decades. This 
allows the President to choose whether to achieve goals through private bargaining and 
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negotiation with Congress and other stakeholders, or through a public appeal.349 
Although Presidents enjoy extensive latitude in shaping public perception of foreign 
affairs and other issues that the average person does not personally experience, they are 
more constrained when it comes to policy issues that people can personally experience, 
such as economic and tax policy. However, it appears facts matter little in either case, as 
oftentimes a President must choose between good policy and misinformed public 
opinion. As a result, Presidents face great political risks when they push unpopular 
policies related to issues that much of the public has firsthand knowledge of, and 
relatively little risk when they push flawed policies that conform to misinformed public 
opinion. Making decisions based on public opinion constrains a President’s ability to 
exercise informed leadership and often the end result is bad policy. 350   
Therefore, it probably makes the most sense for the President to lead on these 
issues from a broad, agenda-setting perspective. It would likely be unhelpful for the 
President to directly engage on the particulars of any of these problems—the debacle of 
the Executive Order on lobbyists in the Obama administration is an obvious example. 
But on the big time issues, like whether or not to raise highway fuel taxes, the agenda is 
probably best set by the President, by virtue of his status as the only representative of 
the entire nation and his ability to garner media attention on a daily basis. 351  
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The Speaker of the House? 
Doug Harris charted the rise of the “Public Speakership” in the 104th Congress, 
nearly twenty years ago. At that time, the growth of the 24/7 news cycle, CSPAN and 
more news coverage generally, compelled Congressional leaders to take to the airwaves 
to promote their agenda.352 Since then, the Speaker and members of his/her leadership 
team have continued to be the chief spokespersons for the House majority party. 
Committee Chairs are weaker than ever, with House and Senate leadership 
deciding when bills are “ripe” enough to be reported out of Committee. Excessive 
control by party leadership is an impediment to efforts to make the Congress more 
nimble and responsive. As one current House Democratic Staffer said it in response to a 
question about the failure to address the gas tax, “The Ways and Means Chairmen need 
to revive the power of their Committee; leadership is far too risk-averse to actually lead 
on important aspects of tax policy, including the gas tax. If the Speaker trusts a member 
enough to appoint him/her to a Committee Chairmanship, they should be willing to 
trust them to exercise judgment on policy in their jurisdiction.”353  
The Speaker is also the party’s chief fundraisers and plays a leading role in the 
recruitment of new candidates. In an era of declining procedural and social norms in the 
House of Representatives, “…the most widespread individual norms appear to be based 
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on party loyalty and success.”354 Under those terms, loyalty to the Speaker is essential for 
members to rise to leadership positions. If the downside of the preeminence of the 
Speakership is an overly cautious approach to bringing bills to the floor and a constant 
weighing of the electoral implications of votes, the upside is that the Speaker today is 
the only member with a full vision of the House. Recent scholarship by Matthew Green, 
building on the work of Mann and Orenstein, outlines that while polarization and a shift 
in norms and expectations to enforce group behavior are significant contributors to 
policy gridlock, any true reform to the practices of the institution must occur by virtue 
of, “…new initiative from within Congress to alter existing rules and practices…such an 
initiative could originate with party leaders…[who] have some leeway to influence the 
legislative process, establish and enforce norms of conduct, and temper (if not prevent 
entirely) the use of procedures to win narrow partisan battles.”355 The Speaker is 
theoretically the only member that the other members all interact with at least somewhat 
regularly. Therefore, any changes are unlikely without leadership from the Speaker.  
The Private Sector? 
The private sector remains a critical part of governance, as intended under the 
First Amendment. In the transportation field examined above, leaders are thought of as 
the people that build infrastructure, design new vehicles or develop clever policy.  
Today, however, in an era of underfunded infrastructure, the attention has rightfully 
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shifted to those who can do more with less and speak honestly and openly about 
challenges. Here in Washington, DC, the WMATA Metro subway system is in a state of 
disrepair that has killed passengers and led to unprecedented travel disruptions. The 
silver lining to all of this turmoil is that the agency’s new leader appears to be creating 
“focusing events” for the transit system and leveraging them accordingly.  
Shortly after joining WMATA as General Manager, Paul Wiedefeld announced 
an immediate 29-hour shutdown of the system to conduct safety inspections.356 While 
previous leaders apparently allowed safety and maintenance lapses to fester, Wiedefeld 
leveraged the discovery of deteriorated electrical cables as an opportunity to draw 
attention to the need for culture change and financial investment. Whether the abrupt 
shutdown of the system for a day was in response to a discrete safety crisis, or an 
attempt to create a public crisis (focusing event) is immaterial at this point. It worked. 
Wiedefeld took a page from Kingdon’s book. As Elizabeth Samet writes, “Leaders are 
responsible, restrained, attentive, focused, concerned, frightened of the consequences, 
and tempered by real world experiences that have left them compassionate and self 
aware. These qualities make it possible to be creative, ambitious, and daring when there 
really is a crisis.”357 Weidefeld certainly took a daring risk in announcing a system 
shutdown. As Kingdon would have predicted, Congress took notice.  
At a House Oversight Committee hearing shortly after the shutdown, Wiedefeld 
stated, “the safety culture at Metro is neither integrated with operations, nor well-rooted 
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at all levels.” He said there would have to be prolonged shutdowns of entire segments of 
the system in order to bring it to a state of good repair. He also said there would need to 
be major management changes. In response to a suggestion by a Committee member, he 
agreed that the WMATA Board of Directors needs to be made up of transportation and 
financial professionals, rather than politicians. It is difficult to imagine a politician or 
politically appointed Board member relating such a strident indictment of the system.  
Committee members from both parties commended his frank talk and encouraged him 
to continue speaking the truth.358 There is renewed attention on the need to invest in 
public transit systems—the House Transportation Committee held its own hearing on 
transit safety shortly after the Oversight hearing. Weidefeld’s 29-hour shutdown of the 
Metro system for repairs was a focusing event demonstrating the role for non-
government actors to play in reforming public institutions.  
Conclusions 
 Congress tends to set its agenda based on the temporary passions aroused in 
after focusing events. It often prioritizes solutions according to political expediency 
rather than policy merits. Members of Congress avoid taking positions on thorny 
political issues like the gas tax to the extent possible. This means that the Congress rarely 
takes action, and when it does, it is often in the form of clumsy, hastily considered 
legislation, such as the Positive Train Control mandate.  This appears to be a feature of 
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the contemporary American political system. This chapter identifies factors that should 
be considered in any effort to lessen this negative feedback loop.  
 Clearly, the contemporary procedure for reapportioning House of 
Representatives district boundaries (i.e. gerrymandering) promotes political polarization 
that makes it difficult for the Congress to address policy issues in an orderly manner. It 
places members in a defensive posture from the first day in office. 359 When a member is 
more concerned about the primary election than the general, there is little overlap in the 
political persuasions of voters represented by members of opposing parties.   
 It is unreasonable to expect the Congress to have seasoned, expert staff on hand 
to develop policy when it refuses to allocate monies to pay for them. Boosting staff pay, 
opening new positions for policy experts and amending the federal rulemaking process 
to give the Congress a greater voice in the implementation of laws are worth 
consideration.  
 The Congress also needs to quit contributing to the “outrage” business model of 
many of today’s media companies. The modern media climate rewards “show horse” 
politicians for playing to the extremes in policy debates and is largely indifferent to 
“workhorse” politicians take political risks to collaborate with colleagues and enact wise 
policy.360 Shutting down CSPAN so that members are comfortable actually debating 
issues is likely untenable, but that does not mean individual members have to use it as a 
forum to attack the character and motivations of members of the opposition. Facts are 
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objective, people are not. Media coverage of politics today cloaks profit-driven obsession 
with scandal and controversy under the guise of objectivity. This is not to suggest there 
should be any limitation on the First Amendment rights of journalists. Indeed, there is 
no obvious or straightforward solution to this problem, but one place to start is to cast 
off the notion that there is such a thing as objectivity among journalists. 
 Just as the First Amendment must remain sacrosanct for journalists, it must also 
protect the activities of persons wishing to petition their government. This chapter 
reveals that efforts purported to diminish the influence of professional lobbyists—such 
as the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act—have only served to concentrate 
and enhance the influence of the most well financed and organized interests. Not only is 
it contrary to the spirit of the First Amendment to regulate the ability of people to 
advocate for their interests, the current regulatory regime harms public trust in the 
institution. If there is a problem with lobbying in Washington, DC, it is not that there are 
too many lobbyists in the halls of Congress; it is that not everyone is represented. The 
system of regulating lobbying makes it harder for smaller groups with fewer resources 
to be engaged in the political process in a meaningful way. Furthermore, President 
Obama’s prohibition against lobbyists serving in his Administration has simply driven a 
large portion of the advocacy industry underground, which surely does not contribute 
to the stated goal of increasing public disclosure of these activities.  
Kingdon’s theory based on his field research in the 1970s is bolstered by 
Drutman’s recent treatise on the true role of lobbyists in Washington, along with 
Allard’s spirited advocacy for the public service of the lobbying occupation. All 
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conclude that lobbyists maintain an important agenda-setting role in Washington.361 
Furthermore, the examples laid out in the first two chapters of this thesis support their 
conclusions that lobbyists play an important role in the legislative process. In the PTC 
examples, lobbyists were essential to raising the alarm that the deadline would need to 
be extended and garnering support for a workable extension. In the gas tax example, 
lobbying by conservative groups has influenced decisions to avoid raising the tax. And 
in the truck weight example, lobbyists from the trucking industry successfully got their 
policy item on the agenda, only to lose a key vote after an overwhelming lobbying press 
by opposing interests. The key lesson is that the role of lobbyists is substantial and 
should be embraced rather than vilified, so that more voices and perspectives are 
involved in setting the agenda.  
 It is no surprise that members of Congress find few opportunities to collaborate 
to advance legislation these days. Not only do their political constituencies not overlap, 
they hardly ever see each other in person. There is no straightforward way to measure 
the impact of so few members living and working in Washington full time, but 
anecdotal reports indicate it has a real effect.  
 Addressing any of these issues will require dedicated leadership from all of the 
stakeholders: the President, Congressional Leadership, and influential members of the 
private sector that have an interest in having a functioning Legislative Branch.  
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Politics is complicated; so is determining how to reform public institutions like 
the U.S. Congress. Countless variables come together to form legislative policy 
outcomes.  This thesis portfolio demonstrates the utility Kingdon’s theory of focusing 
events as key motivators for Congressional action, along with his and others’ conclusion 
that politically vulnerability among Congressmen makes them hesitant to take political 
risks unless absolutely necessary. Knowledge of this theory should inform leaders in 
American business, public service as they seek to enhance the ability of the First Branch 






Conclusions and Suggestions for  
Additional Research 
“Change may come because of a horrendous crisis (i.e. the Abramoff model), 
which would reinforce the idea that the problem is corruption. Or maybe if there 
is a party changeover—as occurred in 1995 when the Lobbying Disclosure Act 
was enacted. But most likely change will occur if there is a broader, omnibus 
congressional reorganization package to restructure the institution, and lobbying 
issues are included in that bill. This seems to occur every 20 years or so; maybe 
it’s time.” 362 –Lee Drutman  
This portfolio offers significant but limited insight into an extremely complex 
process of determining when an idea’s time comes. Needless to say, not every angle of 
this subject is covered in the above discussion. However, several conclusions are 
obvious. The first is that Kingdon’s theory continues to hold strong predictive value as a 
tool for understanding how Congress operates. Obviously, it is an imprecise tool, but 
therein lays its utility and it does not pretend to be otherwise.  
The theory would have predicted a rapid, disproportionate response to the 2008 
railroad accident in California. Importantly, it would have accurately predicted that the 
response would be based more on short-term political expediency than on long-term 
policy objectives. As chapter one demonstrates, if the goal was to enhance rail safety, 
then the PTC mandate as enacted was irrational. The theory also observes that when 
political expediency and the drive to act in the midst of a crisis overwhelm the desire to 
get the policy right, implementation problems are almost inevitable. The first chapter’s 
discussion of the interagency coordination and technological tribulations that eventually 
led to a delay of the PTC implementation deadline is yet another proof point for the 
                                                          




value of the theory. In other words, the one time the Congress expended considerable 
political bandwidth addressing an important rail transportation safety issue in the past 
decade, it fumbled the outcome.  
Equally important as when the Congress overreacts to a perceived crisis is when 
it does nothing despite the existence of a crisis. The second chapter finds that Kingdon’s 
theory aligns with two federal highway policy outcomes in recent years. The Congress’s 
refusal to increase federal excise taxes on gasoline—despite a steady decline in 
purchasing power of the non-inflation adjusted tax while the need for infrastructure 
investment mounts—is a confirmation of the notion that the Congress will not respond 
to a slow crisis. An issue needs to be exciting for Congress to act; a slow daily commute 
does not get attention like a train wreck. Kingdon’s theory also holds that the Congress 
will only respond to a crisis if there is an acceptable policy option on its agenda. An 
examination of the degree to which members of the House and Senate are politically 
vulnerable—or at least believe themselves to be politically vulnerable—informs an 
understanding of why the Congress in 2015 chose to fund highway programs for five 
years with non-transportation sources. It also explains why they have resisted calls from 
well established representatives of the trucking and agriculture industries to increase 
federal highway truck weight limits.  
Clearly, one should not simply accept that our national legislative body is 
incapable of making rational policy decisions. Imagine trying to literally run a railroad 
when the Congress suddenly sends you and your colleagues a $10 billion bill to install a 
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technology system that is not even for sale and will only prevent a tiny fraction of 
potential accidents. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect a democratic institution to not 
respond to the occasional passionate whims of the public, or to hope that the politicians 
elected to serve in it will not take advantage of every opportunity to improve their 
standing with their constituencies. But at the very least, those with a vested interest in 
public policy outcomes should consider the available options to make it more likely the 
Congress will respond to the demand placed on it as a political institution with the best 
available policy.  
To that end, the third chapter concludes that such a discussion must consider the 
most relevant contributing factors to dysfunction: issues related to how Congressional 
districts are apportioned; the capacity of the Congress and its personnel to identify good 
policy choices; how to operate in a media climate that values the show horse over the 
work horse; how excessive and irrational restrictions on First Amendment protections 
influence the Congressional agenda; and how difficult it must be for politicians who do 
not know each other to find opportunities for compromise.  
Design Limitations and the Need for Additional Examples  
This portfolio examines only one example of impulsive Congressional activity in 
the wake of a focusing event, and two examples of inaction on policy. Ideally, future 
research should test the Kingdon theory against a randomly generated sample of 
policies to gain a better understanding of its validity and predictive power. Doing so 
would also offer opportunities to evaluate what Kingdon acknowledges as a limitation 
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of his theory: it helps us predict when there will be action, but it is essentially agnostic as 
to whether the outcome will be favorable or unfavorable to those who placed an issue on 
the agenda in the first place.363 
Substantive Issues In Need of Further Examination  
The Earmark Ban 
Based on the interviews conducted for this research, the one subject missing from 
the above discussion is the contribution of the earmark ban to institutional dysfunction. 
Perhaps lobbying’s only competition for the prize for the subject with the most 
unfounded, irrational public scorn is earmarks.  As one former staffer put it, “The 
earmark ban means members of Congress have no buy-in into the process. It makes 
passing bills so much harder.”364 Another shared a similar sentiment, that “Earmarks 
allow people who know a community best to direct spending accordingly. Even though 
the House is dysfunctional, the members know their districts very well.”365 It was not 
immediately obvious to the author how much of a role the earmark ban may play in 
contributing to the Congress operating in fits of impulsivity followed by lulls of 
inactivity. However, almost every interview participant identified the earmark ban as a 
continuing factor to the decline of regular order and congeniality in the institution. 
Unfortunately, these interviews were conducted late in the writing process due to 
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bureaucratic delays with University’s Institutional Review Board, leaving little time for 
complete research of the topic. the A future version of this paper must include a 
comprehensive discussion of this as a contributing factor to gridlock.  
The Decline of Decorum in Washington and Friendship Among Elected Officials 
 The above discussion how the lack of professional and social interaction by 
members of Congress today might contribute to the low levels of collaboration among 
members of different political parties is very much constrained by a lack of research in 
this area. Furthermore, any formal examination of this question would be plagued by 
methodological problems. Not only is it likely impossible to quantify social interaction 
levels—especially in a historical sense—the changes observed occurred over a period of 
decades, while other aspects of American life and society changed as well. That is not to 
say it is not worth trying to understand this phenomena, but formal research into this 
subject will likely always be limited to anecdotal accounts, which are bound to be 
inadvertently revised by anyone recalling those “good old days” when the system 
worked better.  
Lessons Learned  
The overarching implication of validity of Kingdon’s theory of Congressional 
activity being driven by focusing events is simple: Congress is mostly likely to act only 
on major issues in a crisis, and when it does act, it probably won’t be anything close to 
an ideal policy response. For transportation policy, this theoretically means people have 
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to be hurt or killed for the Congress to take notice. If the problem is only likely to make 
people miserable on a daily basis, as is the case with underfunded highway and transit 
systems, the Congress will typically allow problems to fester until they eventually get 
attention. Again, in a safety-critical industry like transportation, this usually means 
people dying, as occurred on the D.C. Metro system recently. The one hope for the 
future that can be taken from all of this is that maybe the transportation $100 billion 
“fiscal cliff” of 2020 will foster a constructive, rational dialog and policy response to the 
transportation program funding question. 
Perhaps it is naive to think any purposeful intervention could bring institutional 
change. After all, the previous chapters are about how unexpected events lead to most 
Congressional activity. But we should not forget that each of the contemporary policies 
that exacerbate the Congress’s tendency towards fits of activity or total stasis can be 
reversed. Kingdon teaches us that we had better have our policy proposal on the agenda 
before an event makes it politically convenient to enact it. The lesson is that we must 
make sure any suggestions for changes to these policies are legitimized and taken 
seriously well ahead of any crisis. In other words, thought leaders in this country with 
influence over Congressional activity should keep Kingdon’s theory in mind and work 
to get these issues “in the kitchen” so that they are “on the menu” of acceptable policies 
when a relevant focusing event occurs.  
There is a high level of political discontent in America today. Most people have 
little to no faith in their government, but they do not know what to do about it. They 
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want to change this system, but do not think about the consequences of changing that 
system. Instead, they simply want to put a proverbial stick in the spoke and see what 
happens. They think the best tool to get this right is a hammer, without realizing how 
incredibly nihilistic that is. Just about any other possible system for making changes 
would be better than destruction. The lesson from this thesis to take home, to the Board 
Room, or the Committee room, is that if you want your preferred alternatives to be on 
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